Civil-military relations in Pakistan have been remained, predominantly, smooth and straight in the history of Pakistan with it is, explicitly, more tilt towards military establishment. Period of Z.A Bhutto has been marked as a unique period in the history of civil-military relations in Pakistan due to efforts for radical changes in these relations as a result of constitutional reforms and politico-administrative measures. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto adopted the policy of curtailment of power of military through constitutional-cum-administrative measures on the one hand, and the strategy to restore the lost morale of the army by increasing its budget and through enhancement of salaries of the military personnel on the other hand. This paper locates the independence, autonomy and strength of the democratic parliament and democratic regime of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto as well as the power and area of influence of the army in the political affairs of Pakistan.

**Introduction**

Civil-military relations describe the relationship between civil society as a whole and the military organization or organizations established to protect it. More narrowly, it describes the relationship between the civil authority of a given society and its military authority. Ministry of defense has been empowered as military authority for decision-making on country’s behalf. A civilian group, a military group or an individual may be delegated with military authority. The apparatus of a state constitutes its civilian authority which is also called civilian government. Military units do not form the state apparatus as are to enforce law and order in the country. Military flexes its muscles to dominate the state-affairs through the doctrine of ‘civil-military operations (CMO). This doctrine incurs that military clinches maximized support from civil government and, on the contrary,
minimizes civil intervention in military ambit to accomplish its hegemony. On the other hand, the doctrine of ‘civilian control of the military’ states that ultimate responsibility of decision-making for the defense strategy of the country lies with the civilian political leadership. The very doctrine does not permit the professional military officers to formulate the strategic-cum-defense policy of the country. In modern states, police force performs the role of law enforcement in the society. In modern democratic states, capitalist or communist, the fundamental function of the army is defined as waging of war against foreign aggression and to protect its citizens from external threats. The task of the military is also to prosecute war against another state to ensure security and to strengthen the defense of the country. In contrary to this, in developing and underdeveloped states of the world, military performs some additional sanctioned and non-sanctioned functions within a society. These functions include the promotion of a political agenda, securing economic interests, protecting corporate benefits and construction.

British political theory left a remarkable legacy of domination of civil-political over military which is inherited by Pakistan since its inception. Soon after the independence, military swayed over the political horizon and the newly-born country witnessed the ever-growing influence of military into politics. Resultantly, Pakistan degenerated into a praetorian state. Armed forces’ supremacy into politics dragged Pakistan down to its doom even sooner with dreadful political, social and economic fallouts. Multiple variables caused the process of militarization of Pakistan. There is no one cause of military intervention into politics. Rather, there is a cluster of reasons which led to the involvement of armed forces into political field, including the incapacity and non-deliverability of the politicians as the two major causes. There is a tinge of suspicion and distrust on both sides so far as civil-military relations are concerned. Pakistan’s political system has not been remained viable to the extent that it could evolve trust and predictability in civil-military relations through constitutional experiences and other political developments.

There are multifaceted and varied causes of military intervention in politics in the continent of Asia in particular and across the world in general. Countries like Turkey, Thailand, South Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam, Pakistan, Burma, Afghanistan, Cambodia and Bangladesh have been subjected to military interference directly or indirectly. Political regimes have been changed by military establishments in one way or the other way to fashioning the state of political affairs in most of the countries of Asia. (Rizvi, 2000) By the introduction of the myth of ‘Martial Races’ the British established a well-equipped and skilled military force in India. During the riots that broke out at the partition of India, handful of soldiers escorted convoys to safety, occasionally engaging in a running battle. Thus Pakistan inherited a revered army, respected by all citizens. (Butt, 2014) Founder of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah died in 1948 while first Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan was assassinated in 1951. The death of Quaid-e-Azam and of Quaid-e-Millat created a vast political vacuum over the political horizon of Pakistan. The first
military involvement in the politics took place in 1956 when General Muhammad Ayub Khan was appointed as minister for defence and commander-in-chief of the Pakistan army. The role of military into civilian matters was enhanced after this development in Pakistan.

In 1958, General Muhammad Ayub Khan imposed first Martial Law in Pakistan and took over as Martial Law administrator. The period from 1958 to 1964 has been counted as the ‘Golden Era’ in the history of Pakistan. Ayub khan laid great emphasis on the developmental process in West Pakistan, ignoring altogether the development in eastern wing of the country. General Yahya Khan followed the footsteps of General Ayub Khan and took over the power as second military ruler after the deposition of the later from power in 1969. During 1971-1977, there came a short interregnum of civilian control over political matters under the charismatic leadership of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the founding chairman of Pakistan People’s Party. Mr. Bhutto tried to strengthen the civilian rule in politics by relegating the army into back yard for the first time in the political history of Pakistan. Bhutto kept the military aloof from political matters. He also sacked the General Gul Hassan Khan and Air Marshal Rahim as commander-in-chief and air chief respectively. Z.A Bhutto was the first democratically elected prime minister who maintained the civil control over the administrative system of Pakistan. In order to appease the army, he raised the salaries of army officers as well as he restored the shaken confidence of the army after the fall of Dhaka on December 16, 1971. Z.A Bhutto was arrested along with his cabinet ministers in a military coup by General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq on 5th of July, 1977. Bhutto was martyred to death by Zia regime in 1979. Zia-ul-Haq remained in power for eleven years until his death in an Air Crash near Bahawalpur. (Tahir, 2008)

Pakistan People’s Party came under the rage of coercive state apparatus of Zia-ul-Haq who tried hard to wipe out the Pakistan People’s Party from the annals of history of Pakistan. Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif played musical chairs for the prime minister’s chair. This period marked from 1988 to 1999, in which five COASs, General Aslam Baig, Asif Nawaz, Waheed Kakar, Jehangir Karamat, and finally General Pervez Musharraf were appointed mostly by civilian rulers. General Aslam Baig and General Asif Nawaz had managed to make politicians dance to their tunes by pulling their strings behind the curtain. General Waheed Kakar and General Jehangir Karamat remained apolitical by distancing themselves from active politics. General Pervez Musharraf proved to be a last straw at the camel’s neck when, on October 12, 1999, he sacked elected prime minister Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif in a successful military coup d’état by putting an end to the game of musical chairs for the chair of prime minister.

Roots of Military Takeovers in Pakistan

There are many reasons for military intervention in the politics of Pakistan. “It is considered that over-developed state structure was the basic reason behind the strength of the military-bureaucratic oligarchy in Pakistan. Like all colonial
states, the colonial administrators used the whip of military and bureaucracy to control the society”. (Alvi, 1965) Pakistan as a state, inherited a strong army from the British Imperial Raj right from its inception. Military emerged, over the time, as a well-integrated and well-disciplined force in Pakistan. There remained very bleak chances to drive the army into back seat in the country. The genesis of the civil-military relations, in Pakistan, can be better understood by considering the factor that long rule of army in Pakistan has deeper impact on the personality and psyche of the men and officers of the army on the one hand, and has created a sense of superiority and a sense of alienation towards civilians on the other hand. Military’s proclivity to assess civilian efficiency and performance from their own perspective causes impact on civil-military relations. Army perceives itself as the ruthless defender of the country.

Military reversions into power corridors can be directly linked with unreasonable role of politicians into politics which shows their incapacity and limited vision to run the affairs of the state in a constructive manner for the security, peace and prosperity of the country. Losing of popular support by the politicians, and peoples’ welcome attitude for the arrival of army also constitutes an important reason for the stepping of army into political arena. Civil governments, for time to time, have invited army to liquefy the issues related to people and not to the army. “If the government continues to use troops to quell public demonstrations, and the economic, social and political crisis deepens in the society, military intervention is, often, what Janowitz terms, reactive rather than designed, a gesture of self-interested or public-spirited despair against the inadequacies of politicians”. (Rizvi, 2000) Civilian leadership depends on the army regarding different issues such as the matters of public revolts, terrorism, and other socio-economic factors. Repeated military operations in different parts of the country have paved the way for enhanced and active militarism in the country.

Dominance of Indian Threat

It is worth mentioning that Indian factor in becoming Pakistan a security state has played a pivotal role. Right from the inception of Pakistan in 1947, Indian antagonism towards Pakistan has been remained an ever-growing phenomenon. In this context, it was not possible for Pakistan to lessen the size and power of the army to a formidable extent. Pakistan’s existence as an independent state is like an arrow in bull’s eye for India from the day first. Indian leadership did not accept the formation of Pakistan at heart and is always in struggle to destabilize the state of Pakistan on all counts. Bhutto’s conscious attempt to thwart the resilience of the army in the wake of potential Indian aggression was a miscalculation and misnomer which is resented and rejected by the armed forces. Pakistanis, as a Nation, have been remained very sensitive to the Indian gesture of hostility and enmity towards Pakistan. No such endeavor on the part of a civilian government, as to diminish the size and power structure of Pakistan Army, would have been accepted by masses in Pakistan. What so ever the case may be, Bhutto took some
drastic steps to change the command and control structure of the army as an organization. (Siddiqa, 2007)

**Re-defined Civil-Military Relations during Z.A Bhutto Era**

Political history of Pakistan has been marked with constant feature of tug-of-war like situation between the military establishment and civilian elite to control the decision-making process in the country. Pakistan military has caused formidable impact on the political horizon of Pakistan right from the inception of Pakistan as an independent and sovereign state. (Iftikhar, 1997) Period of Z.A Bhutto is no exception to this ongoing strife in civil-military relations in Pakistan. First democratically elected parliament of Pakistan, which emerged due to the elections of 1970 under military rule of General Yahya Khan, was encompassed in the political system of Pakistan. Z.A Bhutto’s era has been categorized as the era of first ever domination of civilian administration over military establishment. This was happened, for the first time, in the turbulent history of civil-military relations of Pakistan. It was due to unbridled ambition of Z.A Bhutto for civil supremacy which caused an ample damage to the hegemony of military by exerting civilian authority for the first time in history of Pakistan.

Mr. Bhutto wanted to establish ‘people’s army’ in place of traditional/regular army. Bhutto’s attempt to sideline the army so far as its political and administrative role is concerned was mounted in the form of severe differences between Z.A Bhutto and army chief, General Gul Hassan Khan. Conflict of interest between Bhutto and Gul Hassan Khan appeared on various occasions. Gul Hassan dismantled the order of Bhutto on the issue of sending troops to Karachi to control the restive work force. Gul Hassan rejected the proposal of Bhutto to get the army officers screened out by police or intelligence agencies. Bhutto was not allowed by the army to attend the meeting of the promotion and selection board of the army in February 1972. By harping on the same tune, General Gul Hassan gave denial to government’s order to crush the strike of Peshawar police by force. These developments caused a serious split between military leadership and civilian leadership. Army Chief, also, reacted vehemently in response to Bhutto’s efforts to put the army in a subordinated position. Bhutto, ultimately, managed to sack Gul Hassan Khan and Air Marshal Raheem Khan to induce an additional incitement in the resentment of the armed forces. (Ayub, 2005)

Although Pakistan had experienced civilian leadership before Bhutto government yet it was the first period of civilian supremacy rule following the country’s first military coup in 1958. (Saeed, 1997) Military intervention, in either form, is the hallmark of Pakistan’s politics. There is no match between well-organized institution of military and feebly-organized political institutions of Pakistan. The dismemberment of East Pakistan had caused a serious stigma on the face of army but it did not last long and army had managed to recover from the impacts of this retreat even sooner. (Cohen, 2012) Z.A Bhutto made extensive
struggle to accomplish hegemony of civil government over armed forces. It was the vision of Z.A. Bhutto to change the entire structure of military high command by launching some gigantic changes in the administration of the army. He erected Federal Security Force and reorganized intelligence agencies to establish his control on all institutions on a firmer level. To analyze the civil-military relations during Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto era, it can be ascertained that Bhutto tried to control the military through following four measures:-

i. Imposing constitutional constraints on the public role of the military.
ii. Manipulation of geo-political factor
iii. Instituting changes in the command structure of the army.
iv. Creation of paramilitary force FSF in order to reduce the dependency on military (Rifat, 2015)

Constitutional Measures

Z.A Bhutto appeared on the realm of the affairs after the debacle of East Pakistan. The defeat in the war of 1971 forced military junta to recede to the back foot for the time being. Z.A Bhutto, after having assumed power in 1971, introduced a massive plan of constitutional reforms to halt the intrusion of the military into politics through constitutional and political measures. (Kapur, 2006) Parliament maintained its supremacy by using constitutional framework to cut the interference of the military short into decision-making policies. Army’s role as defenders of the country’s external boundaries was assigned to them to make them realize about their allocated constitutional duty. (Saeed, 1997)

Functional boundaries of the army were glaringly defined in the constitution of 1973. This Constitution accomplished civilian authority over state affairs. According to the constitutional innovations military was relegated to the backward position by limiting its functionality to defense and security of the country. Capital punishment like life imprisonment and death sentence was approved by parliament in the form of a bill for conspiring, abrogating or subverting the constitution. Such an act would be treated as ‘high treason’ against the state of Pakistan. (Salik, 1997) It was made obligatory for military personnel to take oath for not taking part in any kind of political activities directly or indirectly. According to constitution of Pakistan, military has to extend support to civilian government in emergency situations within the country. It has to provide required assistance to civilian regime in the hour of natural calamities like earth quakes and heavy floods etc. It is equally obligatory for armed forces to defend the country’s geographical boundaries in the wake of external threats. (Rizvi, 2000)

Administrative Measures

Bhutto, forcibly, retired two Air vice Marshals, one Air Marshal, eleven Lieutenant Generals, two Generals, ten Major Generals, four Rear-Admirals, and one Vice-Admiral. Thus Bhutto maintained civilian hegemony over the military
top brass first ever in the history. Bhutto, thus, conveyed a serious message to the military to not poke its nose in the political matters of the country. (Bhutto’s Address to the Nation on 4th March, 1972) General Tikka Khan was appointed as the first Chief of Army Staff (COAS) of the Pakistan army, and Air Marshal Zafar Chaudhury was appointed as the Chief of Air Staff. Bhutto-Tikka Khan alliance worked successfully with professional and constitutional spirit. Thus Tikka Khan’s professionalism and constitutionalism helped Bhutto in establishing civilian authority over military.

The Court Marshal Trial of the fifty-nine military officers was announced by the government on March 30, 1973, on the charges of hatching a plot to overthrow the government. Similarly twelve Air Force officers were arrested on the same charge of plotting a conspiracy for the demolition of Bhutto regime on May 2, 1973. Major General Zia-ul-Haq presided over the Court Marshal trial of the military officers who were involved in hatching the conspiracy. (Ayub, 2005) A perpetual wave of resentment was going on among army and Air Force officers against Bhutto’s steps to delegate civilian supremacy on the military. (Times, 1973) This plan could not be materialized due to its prior leakage to the government. (Rizvi, 2000) Air Marshal Zafar Chaudhry, the Chief of Air Staff, ordered the forced retirement of the Air Force officers who were held responsible for hatching the conspiracy against government. This decision of Air Headquarters was revisited and revised by the federal government by reinstating some of the officers to their ranks to the utter disappointment of the Air Force leadership. Air Marshal Zafar Chaudhry was compelled to resign from his office, which he did, as a logical repercussion of this happening.

Z. A Bhutto tried to put a check on commercial enterprises of military so that it could not be allowed to grow as an autonomous organization with financial ventures. Bhutto struggled hard to curtail the fiscal autonomy of the army, but these efforts could not bear fruit. It was erroneous notion of Mr. Bhutto that he could bridle the military to act as a tamed and domesticated force to realize his own vested interests. However, in the backdrop of this scenario, military managed to revive itself as a forceful entity in the power structure of Pakistan. (Siddiqa, 2007)

**Establishment of Parallel Security Force**

Z. A Bhutto created Federal Security Force (FSF) to lessen his dependence on military troops so far as domestic matters were concerned. The formation of Federal Security Force caused eruption of another controversy between the government and the army. The formation of Federal Security Force was, reportedly, a clear message of Bhutto’s futuristic renderings towards political rivals and army Generals. FSF had been viewed by military top brass as the parallel force to counter the influence of the army indigenously. Civilian government struggled to get rid of the army’s support so far as internal matters of security and administration were concerned. Understandably, it was quite
untoward state of affairs for military elite because it was not a tolerable innovation for the so-called prestige and prerogative of the army. This development posed an arduous challenge to the privileged status of the army as a sole axis of power within Pakistan. It was assumed that FSF was Bhutto’s private force which had been extended to appropriate his self-realized objectives. Military leadership took it as a direct assault to curtail the importance of the Pakistan army by civilian regime by lessening government’s reliance on army in internal strife or calamities. (Siddiqa, 2007)

It was supposed that FSF was organized to give tough time to opposition. Bhutto used FSF, on many occasions to curb his political opponents and to accomplish his position as a sole stakeholder in the political arena of Pakistan. These strategies proved that Bhutto was not a sole democrat as he displayed an attitude of intolerance towards opposition by using FSF for the victimization of opposition leaders. (Haqqani, 2005)

Repercussions of Bhutto’s Reforms

This is beyond any tinge of doubt that Bhutto installed an unprecedented agenda of institutional, constitutional, political, bureaucratic and administrative reforms. He tried to establish civilian control over all state institutions in letter and spirit. Simultaneously, undemocratic disposition of Bhutto, even in exclusive political issues, dragged him down to his doom even sooner. (Maluka, 1995) Bhutto endeavored to accumulate and centralize all powers within the office of the
Prime Minister by launching a reformist strategy. He had ambition to subside military, bureaucracy and even parliament and cabinet through introducing reforms. Bhutto introduced a wide-range program of upheaval changes in the Pakistani society. Bhutto’s reformist plan includes socio-economic reforms, strengthening of political institutions infrastructure, instrumental role of Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) for socio-political change, extraction of popular support in maximization and the assertion of civilian supremacy over the military. Military leadership observed these measures consciously and carefully. (Rizvi, 2000)

Bhutto’s assertion to substantiate civilian hegemony over the military ended in smoke due to variegated factors. Bhutto fatally failed to recognize the bitter ground realities. Opposition leaders turned down against Bhutto’s dictatorial rule, consequently encouraged the military to come to the fore by tooth and nail. Military responded ruthlessly by emerging from the ashes of 1971 debacle. Personalized and self-centered politics of Z. A. Bhutto shook the foundations of parliamentary democracy in Pakistan by providing an opportunity to oppositional forces to react, vehemently, to turn the tide. Bhutto’s bid to flex his political muscles proved a wild goose chase. Military generals took the advantage of the situation by discrediting Bhutto regime and by retrieving the political initiatives taken by civil government of Z. A. Bhutto.

Alleged rigging in general elections of 1977 flared up a massive protestation by combined opposition (Pakistan National Alliance-PNA) against the government of Bhutto. Widespread series of protests adopted violent shade with the passage of time. These circumstances weakened the democratic footing of Bhutto government, ironically strengthened and encouraged the military to retaliate with full vigor and vitality to grab its lost leverage. Army continued to adhere its allegiance to civilian government under General Zia-ul-Haq who was appointed as army chief in 1976 after the retirement of General Tikka Khan as army chief. It is affirmed that there was a complete sense of romance in civil-military relationship deflected between Bhutto and Tikka Khan. The honey moon period of Bhutto regime of bringing the army under civilian domination ended when General Zia-ul-Haq successfully managed to overthrow the government of Bhutto on 5 July, 1977, as a result of a military coup in the country.

Conclusion

Z.A Bhutto possessed a very charismatic personality in the politics of Pakistan. Bhutto’s charismatic-cum-fabulous personality governed, in largely, the civil-military relations in the period of 1971-1977. Personality of Bhutto had been remained the centre of gravity, during Bhutto regime, in the formation of the relationship between army and the government. Bhutto made arduous efforts to establish the hegemony of the civilian authority over the army by curtailting the hegemonic designs of the power-seeker Generals of the army. Bhutto tried to cut the powers of the army short from inside of the army. To much extent, Bhutto remained successful in reducing the powers of the army through constitutional-
cum-administrative measures. The war of 1971 between India and Pakistan was resulted into the fall of Dhaka. Defeat of Pakistan army in 1971, had shattered the confidence of the army to a considerable extent. In order to win confidence of the people, army had decided to remain behind the scene. Bhutto tried to manage the army according to his own political ambitions, but he did not weaken the supremacy of the army as an institution. Armed Forces, after the restoration of their lost confidence, fired back vigorously in 1977 by overthrowing the democratic government of Z.A Bhutto.

**Recommendations**

Erosion of civil supremacy in Pakistan is due to dearth of visionary political leadership, resulting into weak governments, political instability and poor governance. Inability of successive governments to curb lawlessness, discontentment and disharmony in the society as well as undemocratic attitude of politicians widened this gulf between civilian administration and military establishment. Somber exhibition of the politically elected governments in the financial fields, involvement in corruption and favoritism, absence of efficient and competent political institutions are amounted to weaken the democratic political culture and system. It is equally important that extensive involvement of military into routine political affairs of the government thereby impairing public confidence in government’s dexterity is another factor for creating an unbridgeable gap in civil-military relations in Pakistan.

Hopefully, army will have to stay in the barracks by isolating itself from political matters. It would have required from army to flex its power muscle to the country’s external borders with full force and concentration. Likewise, the politicians should also show greater sense of responsibility by not inviting the army to takeover or maligning the army as a habit to cover their own failings. Both the military and civil leadership would develop better understanding and try to improve civil-military relations and strengthen democratic institutions. This can happen only when the politicians recognize their own failings and carryout self-correction and start behaving more maturely rather than continuing to parrot hackneyed themes and portraying Field Marshal Ayub Khan, Gen Yahya, Gen Zia, Gen Musharraf and Gen Kayani in poor light and blaming them for every wrong that takes place.
References


