



RESEARCH PAPER

K.K. Aziz's Historiography: A Review on "The Making of Pakistan" in Perspective of Nationalist Muslims and Muslim Nationalism

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After 1857, the British intensified their efforts to create a constitutional and political environment for the gradual implementation of the Western democratic system in India. As a result in 1885, a regular political party, the Indian National Congress, was founded. It was the first modern nationalist movement to make an appearance in the British Empire in Asia and Africa. While on the other hand, in December 1906, the All India Muslim League was established in Dacca. Both were the remarkable political parties of the colonial period. During the imperial period in the Indian subcontinent, the two major political parties of the independence movement had different national ideologies. All India Muslim League was a supporter of Muslim Nationalism, while the Indian National Congress was a supporter of the Nationalist Muslim ideology. This was the basic and main difference that causes the partition of the Indian Subcontinent in 1947. K.K. Aziz is one of Pakistan's top historians. Although his work is multi-faceted, his scholarly work on Muslim nationalism in the subcontinent is highly commendable. In this paper, an attempt has been made to explain it in the light of his work and a comparative analysis of Muslim nationalism and Nationalist Muslims have been taken under consideration.

Introduction

K.K. Aziz is better known as Prof. Dr. Khursheed Kamal Aziz (1927-2009) was one of Pakistan's leading historians. He was born in Ballamabad, Chiniot. He has written many books on the history of pre-partition India, Pakistan. He is also incomparable to writing biographies. He served as the faculty member of G.C. Lahore, and the Universities of the Punjab, Khartoom, Heidelberg, and London. He

had also served as a lecturer in history, Islam, and politics at the Universities of Islamabad, Peshawar, Karachi, Dacca, Geneva, and Cambridge, etc. He also worked as Special Adviser to the Prime Minister, Dy. Official Historian and Head of the National Commission on Cultural and Historical Research.(The Institute of Ismaili Studies, n.d.)As for this research paper is a concern, it is inlight of his famous work '*The Making of Pakistan: A Study in Nationalism.*'

Here is a list of K.K. Aziz's famous books:

1. Britain and Muslim India
2. Some Problems of Research in Modern History
3. The Making of Pakistan: A Study in Nationalism
4. Ameer Ali: His Life and Work
5. The Historical Background of Pakistan
6. The India Khilafaat Movement 1915-1933
7. The All India Muslim Conference 1928-1935
8. Britain and Pakistan
9. Party Politics in Pakistan 1947-1958
10. The British in India
11. Complete Works of Rahmat Ali (2 volumes)
12. Muslims under Congress Rule in India 1937-1939 (2 volumes)
13. A History of the Idea of Pakistan (4 volumes)
14. Rahmat Ali: A Biography
15. The Partition of India and the Emergence of Pakistan
16. Prelude to Pakistan (2 volumes)
17. Public Life in Muslim India
18. The Pakistani Historian
19. The Murder of History
20. Are We Living in a Democratic Society?

21. A Historical Handbook of Muslim India (2 volumes)
22. A Chronology of Muslim India
23. Modern Muslim India in British Periodical Literature
24. Selected Speeches and Writings of Agha Khan III (2 volumes)
25. Who Havadis Ashna (Urdu)
26. Muslim India: An Annotated and Descriptive Bibliography
27. Religion, Land, and Politics in Pakistan
28. Pakistan's Political Culture
29. Studies in Culture, Art, and Literature
30. The Unknown Woman
31. Autobiography, Vol. I
32. A Bibliography of Islamic Art.(Aziz, The Pakistani Historian, 1992)

Significance of the Study:

This paper manages the examination of the Muslim Nationalism and Nationalist Muslims in Imperial India. Nation, nationalism, or nationality is not any more violent arrangement of words utilized in the cutting edge political vocabulary, nor more basic. During the Middle Age, the nation is a European idea, gatherings of understudies from one nation working in the European educational institutes were called nations. Prague University was partitioned into four nations such as Saxon, Bavarians, Poles, and Bohemians. Archaic Oxford made the Trend a public obstruction: understudies had a place with various countries as indicated by as they came from north or south of the river (Aziz, *The Making of Pakistan: A Study in Nationalism*, 1967, p. 11)

Theoretical Framework of the Study

As indicated by K.K. Aziz in the advanced age; Oxford or Medieval Prague may have had 'nations' among their understudies, yet they had no 'nationality'. The young did not spare it from the assortment of significance. A few people utilized it in the feeling of a gathering of individuals who share certain things for all intents and purpose: you are an ethnicity on the off chance that you have public desires if you are a gathering conceivably however not a nation. Others made it an otherworldly or conceptual or emotional part of nationhood: you have a nationality on the off chance that you feel that you are one of a different gathering. This

unobtrusive differentiation among 'being' and 'having' makes for vagueness, and it does not have to go any further with this. (Aziz, *The Making of Pakistan: A Study in Nationalism*, 1967, p. 12)

About 'nationalism', we will be unable to concur on a definition adequate to all. In any case, there is considerable concurrence on the point that it is an assessment, and awareness, compassion, which ties a gathering of individuals together. It is the craving of a gathering of people, who are now joined by assurances, to live respectively and, if essential, to bite the dust together. This is not enlightening because an investigation of present-day nationalism focuses on thirteen conditions or trustworthiness which appear to make up its confidence (Aziz, *The Pakistani Historian*, 1992, p. 79).

The first is the basic gathering feeling which moves the individuals from a nation. We as a whole have a place with one nation that communicates this assessment. The second, moving from the first is the affection for individual nationals. The third, which is an outcome of the initial two, is normal antagonism toward others like gatherings. The fourth is a typical region had or pined for by a nation. The fifth is the presence of a typical autonomous government or the craving for it. The 6th is the presence of basic good, social, or monetary foundations or thoughts. The seventh is the ownership of some normal social qualities, for example, language, writing, habits, customs, craftsmanship, music, and legends. The eighth is a typical religion. The ninth is regular history or normal inception. The 10th is a typical character shared by the public gathering. The eleventh is a typical pride in public accomplishments and typical distress in public misfortunes. The twelfth is a straightforward commitment to the nation. The latter is the expectation that the nation will one day be extraordinary, or if it is as of now that, the best on the planet (Aziz, *The Making of Pakistan: A Study in Nationalism*, 1967, p. 14).

These are various highlights of nationalism, not its definitions. As a portrayal, every one of them is thin, insufficient, and tricky. Each nationalism is interesting and assumes its personality and shape from its unique situation and climate. Each is a mix of every one of these constituents however never in equivalent extents. It is a compound of all these in fluctuating blends. One nationalism will underline the component of creed, another that of opinion, still another that of strategy. Nonetheless, it is not a great idea to disregard or belittle the part of fantasies in nationalism. They are subject to fixate the brains of their makers and accordingly to get false but rather genuine. There were two belief systems about nationalism in the Indian subcontinent. One depended on secularism and the other depended on religion, in which the previous was the Supporter of the philosophy of 'Nationalist Muslims' and later was the bearer of 'Muslim Nationalism'. (Aziz, *The Making of Pakistan: A Study in Nationalism*, 1967, p. 16)

Nationalist Muslims and Muslim Nationalism

The Urdu-Hindi controversy, the annulment of the Partition of Bengal, and the two-year rule of the Congress government caused Muslims to feel disconnected. This estrangement was not complete. There was all through present-day Indian legislative issues, a part of Muslims that did not stake the overall Muslim opinion that a Muslim understanding was incomprehensible or that partition was the main arrangement. Nationalist Muslims were those who were against Muslim nonconformity, to the two-nation theory (Muslim Nationalism), and later to the Pakistan interest, and who bought into the Congress perspective on the collective issue. They had confidence in one joined Indian nationalism in which strict affiliations were both unimportant and unfortunate.

Significant characteristics of this class are discernible. To start with, it was driven by certain men of outstanding capacity and straightforward earnestness. Their most noticeably awful foes cannot demonstrate that they were without profound feelings or without the mental fortitude to embrace a disagreeable reason. Ansari, Hussain Ahmad Madni, Ajmal Khan, AbulKalam Azad, Mahmood-ul-Hasan, and Muhamad Ali could not be purchased. Besides, it was the first class of keenness instead of a band of mass pioneers. Muhamad Ali was surely a portrait pioneer that Ansari was regarded by the entire nation, and that Ajmal Khan appreciated incredible notoriety among the majority yet this was just valid for the tumultuous *Khilafaat* days. (Azad, *India Wins Freedom: An Autobiographical Narrative*, 1959, p. 113) When the scopes of the movement had debilitated, their crowd shortened and their adherents liquefied away. Others among them, similar to the Deoband *Ulema*, were never the men of people in general. In general, the gathering gave the scholarly initiative to the no-Muslim League Muslims, thoroughly considered a way of thinking to offer spine to their political action, and accidentally, stressed the Muslim of Indian nationalism. (Mian, *Ulama-e-Haqq aur un kay Mujahadana Karnamay*, 1946, p. 97)

The third trait of this gathering was the assorted foundations of its individuals. Their courses of section into governmental issues and their later vocations and feelings were not the equivalents. Azad was an enthusiastic Muslim as a solid defender of unadulterated Islam, and as the one who published *Al-Hilal* from 1912 to 1920, extended and fortified the establishments of Muslim nationalism. However, after the destruction of the *Khilafaat* Movement, he shed his prior thoughts and practically turned into a passionate ally of an assembled Indian nationalism of the Congress assortment, and stayed undaunted to it till the end. Muhammad Ali was a pioneer leader of a Muslim League, a Congressman, a *Khilafaatist*, and towards the end a harmful pundit of the Congress. Ansari and Ajmal Khan were previous leaders of the Muslim League who later went to Congress and never thought back. (Aziz, *The Making of Pakistan: A Study in Nationalism*, 1967, p. 29)

Before analyzing the part of this gathering in Indian governmental issues let us quickly take a gander at their feelings and accepts. Molana Abul Kalam Azad is a

remarkable representative of this school.(Marshall, 2002, p. 179)He is additionally a fascinating examination due to the unexpected major development in his viewpoint which happened in 1920 or quickly a short time later. He started his vocation under the motivation of Sayid Ahmad Khan's works, which extraordinarily intrigued him.(Azad, *India Wins Freedom: An Autobiographical Narrative*, 1959, p. 3)For him, religion and governmental issues were indivisible. When dispatching his weekly paper *Al-Hilal* in June 1912, he pronounced that its point was to welcome Muslims to follow the book of Allah and the Sharia of His Prophet. Distinguishing his hypothesis of nationalism from the Hindus, he composed:

Hindus can, as different countries, resuscitate their mindfulness dependent on common nationalism, yet it is, in fact, unrealistic for Muslims.(Malik, 1963, pp. 269-70)

He kept on purporting and lectures this brand of Muslim nationalism from 1912 to 1920. After the disappointment of the *Khilafat* movement, he overwhelmed his supporters by moving his ground abruptly and suddenly. He repudiated his Islamic nationalism and grasped Indian nationalism. The votary of Muslim nationalism had gone under the spell of the new Turkish nationalism and incipient Arab nationalism and neglected every single before conviction and articulated his confidence in Hindu-Muslim nationalism in India which was an essential of captivating autonomy from the British (Azad, *Khutbat-e-Azad*, 1974, p. 76).

From this time, he turned into a reliable and confided in individual from Congress and never strayed from its strategies. He was first chosen as its leader in 1923 and afterward consistently from 1940 to 1946. His official location at Ramgarh conveyed in March 1940 merits a passing notice. At the point when he spoke, Muslim designs for partition had developed and the Lahore Resolution was embraced in the very month. Yet, absent of Muslim emotions and fears, he rehashed the typical Hindu contentions and guaranteed the Muslims that all eventual well after the British had gone and opportunity had come. There was no push to comprehend the issue to look at the establishments of Muslim worries, to offer any options in contrast to a unified India or Pakistan, to give any distinct confirmations to Muslims, or even to contend his case with conviction.(Azad, *Musalman aur Congress*, n.d, p. 92)

It was this visually impaired recognizable proof with whatever the Congress set down which was Azad's demise. The more he blended himself with Congress and he irritated until 1941 or 1942. It is suspicious if he spoke to anybody aside from the Hindus, the Muslims accepted that he was being abused by Congress to wear the appearance of a public party. How is it possible that Congress would be a Hindu gathering if its leader was a Muslim celestial and scholar? This was a sharp thought yet neglected to work. Nobody was taken in aside from a modest bunch of British liberals who, at any rate, were excessively inclined toward the Congress to be available to conviction.(Marshall, 2002, p. 181)In a book arranged and altered by one

of his steadfast enthusiasts, a notable Congress pioneer, while honoring Azad, composed:

If even Akbar was baffled by his kindred Musalmans, for what reason would it be a good idea for us to be amazed if Maulana Abul Kalam got no reaction from the coordinated Muslims of India today?(Butt, 1942, p. 67)

In 1867, a Dar-ul-Uloom was set up in Deoband under the supervision of Molana Qasim Nanotawi as a counterbalance to Sayid Ahmad Khan's movement based on western and modern thought.(Mian, Jamiat-ul-Ulama Kia Hai, 1957, p. 43) In religion, it was partisan, propounding the lessons of the *Hanafi* School of philosophy. In the range of authority, it was unsophisticated, its arrival restricted to the United Provinces and Delhi. In legislative issues, it was violently hostile to the British, lecturing unfaithfulness to the Government. In 1880, Nanawtawi kicked the bucket and was prevailing by Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, who gave a *Fatwa* that in common issues co-activity with the Hindus was admissible given that it did no savagery to any fundamental standards of Islam.(Faruqi, 1963, p. 43)

To join the Indian National Congress, he was done to permit the supporters of Deoband. In 1905, Gungohi was replaced by Mahmudul Hasan. In 1920, the headship of the school degenerated upon Hussain Ahmad Madani. Deoband was the focal point of traditionalist Islam where youngsters of a strict turn of the brain were prepared in Islamic history, philosophy, and other good old controls. Western learning was impossibility, for it was one of the central convictions of the school that any truck with the heathen west was commensurate to trade-off with sin. Hence, the Dar-ul-Uloom produced *Mullas* who were able in philosophical hair-parting, capable in explaining the orthodoxies of their specific organization, yet uninformed of present-day developments and improvements even in Islam.(Faruqi, 1963, p. 39) At the point when these alumni left the school and started the rounds of the field as peripatetic strict educators, an incredible and considerable for the sake of the profound direction of the average person have lived on his blood and sweat. They have likewise battled religious battles against their partners of different schools, as Barelvis and Ahl-e-Hadith. Their religious preparation had kept them reserved and secluded and mentally offended by individuals taught in mainstream schools and universities (Faruqi, 1963, p. 40).

Maudoodi was not only against the Muslim League but also the worst enemy of Congress. In 1919, the Deoband established the *Jamiyat-ul-Ulama-e-Hind*. For the initial not many years when party governmental issues were quieted by the exigency of the *Khilafaat* lobby, the *Jamiyat* confined all assortments of discerns, however, once the *Khilafaat* issue was deceased the Deobandis took it over and it turned into the political support of the Deoband School. Among its points and items were to shield Islam, Islamic ceremonies and customs, and Islamic nationalism despite seemingly insurmountable opposition harmful to them. To accomplish and ensure the overall religious and public privileges of the Muslims. To build up great and amicable associations with the non-Muslims of the nation to the degree allowed by the

Shariat-e-Islamiyah and to battle for the opportunity of the nation and religion as indicated by the *Shari* destinations.(Mian, Jamiat-ul-Ulama Kia Hai, 1957, p. 10)

In 1928, notwithstanding, the *Jamiyat* amazed the Congress by dismissing the Nehru Report. Its analysis depended on two focuses. The shields accommodated the Muslims were lacking, and the arrangement for territory prestige for India was conflicting with the *Jamiyat's* responsibility to finish freedom (Waheed-uz-Zaman, 1964, p. 177). However, this offense was transitory and harmony was made in the next year when Congress disavowed the Nehru Report. In the elections of 1937, Muslim figures contact crusade coordinated by the Congress, the *Jamiyat* gave full help to the Congress.(Faruqi, 1963, p. 89)

The *Jamiyat*, which represented a joined Nationalism for India, did not hold fast to the two-nation theory restricted to the Pakistan plan, and contended for a regional, instead of religious, and nationalism. Its contentions against Muslim partition were: the demand of Pakistan has British help and is only an appliance produced by them to their arrangement of separation. Pakistan will part and along these lines debilitate the Muslims of India; our genuine adversary is British dominion and our lone obligation to overcome it. Just a unified activity can accomplish this; Muslims abandoned in India after partition will be helpless before the Hindus (no exertion was made to accommodate this assertion with the overall remain of the *Jamiyat* that there was no Hindu-Muslim issue.(Mian, Jamiat-ul-Ulama Kia Hai, 1957, p. 66)

The segment will prevent the teacher exercises of the *Ulema* (it was not clarified whether this would result from simple burdens of public obstructions or from a potential absence of opportunity of converting in free India); Muslim League pioneers are uninformed of Islam, have no belief system, and are just abusing the name of Islam for the common addition of Muslim personal stakes; and Muslim League pioneers are unequipped for working up an Islamic State and their Pakistan will be no in a way that is better than the Turkey of Mustafa Kamal. This incites the inquiry if the *Jamiyat* would have consented to help the Pakistan request had the League chiefs swore that the new State would be Islamic; it additionally appears an inconsistency in the *Jamiyat* thinking: it was, at the same time, maintaining the mainstream nationalism of the Congress and denouncing the non-standard nationalism of the League (Madni, 1945, p. 51).

There was a part in the *Jamiyat* on the issue of its demeanor to the Pakistan plan. In 1946, a segment deserted and shaped a *Jamiyat-ul-Ulma-e-Islam* which worked on the side of the Muslim League. Among the heads of the breakaway gathering, there were two divines of conceded greatness and impressive impact: Molana Ashraf Ali Thanvi and Shabbir Ahmad Osmani.(Mian, Ulama-e-Haqq aur un kay Mujahadana Karnamay, 1946, p. 287)Let the last word on the *Jamiyat* be said by one of them.

The *Ulama* were not set up to monitor the Western-arranged Muslim intellectuals whom they associated to be the delegates with an alternate culture. They were as yet archaic in their standpoint. (Faruqi, 1963, p. 123)

They neglected to comprehend the beginning of the Hindu Renaissance and never attempted to understand the cutting-edge Islam which during the 1930s, under the lovely motivation of Iqbal, turned into a philosophical power. In the perspective of the Pakistan Plan, the core of its resistance lay in its conventional origination of Islam and the future destiny of its Islam in Pakistan. The *Ulama* imagined that it was just they who could give the correct lead to the Muslims (Faruqi, 1963, p. 124)

The Muslim League pioneers were along these lines gotten between two flames of selectiveness; the Congress elite of nationalism and the Deoband restrictiveness of religion. They were too traditionalist to consider entering the standard of Indian nationalism; for the divines, they were too mainstream to even consider leading the Muslims aright. To escape from this cross-fire, they made an alternate origination of nationalism which was incompletely religious somewhat regional (all Muslim-greater part zones should shape Pakistan), and entirely mental (we feel that we are a nation).(Aziz, *The Making of Pakistan: A Study in Nationalism*, 1967, p. 17)Despite their little size, their obfuscated thinking, and their different shortcomings, the part played by the Nationalist Muslims in Indian legislative issues was a long way from immaterial. How might this be clarified?

A few variables helped them to possess a misrepresented spot in the political field. Their best defense was their collusion with Congress. They were embraced by Congress and offered to general society as the main nationalist among Muslims. They were glad to live in this acquired wonder because it brought them status, strength, and monstrous money related assets. This distinguishing proof with an enormous Hindu association had two different outcomes. To begin with, it made them inactive and mentally sterile. On the other hand, their political obligation did not lie past underwriting the Congress strategy, any further effort was pointless. By turning out to be uncritical allies of one gathering, they lost their capacity of reasoning, their autonomy of viewpoint, their previous adaptability of the move, and even their previous propensity for vivacious discussion.(Aziz, *The Making of Pakistan: A Study in Nationalism*, 1967, pp. 19-20)As the adversaries of Muslim nationalism, it was occupant upon them to meet it with the equivalent contention, to attempt to give a stage to non-Muslim League legislative issues, to advance a belief which could at any rate rival different thoughts and offer an option in contrast to partition. By rehashing the Congress authoritative opinion, they affirmed that they had no products of their own to put available. At this, they addressed the cost of disagreeability and close to political elimination.(Aziz, *The Making of Pakistan: A Study in Nationalism*, 1967, pp. 24-25)

This reluctance to strike out another way for themselves is astounding because the Nationalist Muslims were men of mind and capacity. Their wisdom was

generous, their grant careful, and their scholarly accomplishments notable. (Azad, *Khutbat-e-Azad*, 1974, p. 76). At the point when they talked or wrote with regards to the *Khilafaat* or on the side of the Ottoman Empire their contentions were sharp and their insight profound. Ajmal Khan was an artist of differentiation in two dialects and instructed a vivacious creative mind. However, Ansari was an exceptionally learned man in Indian (aside from Islamic) legislative issues their commitment was slight and shallow. Ongoing reliance on Congress had evaporated their wellspring of reasoning. But then there were a large number of Muslims who, regardless of their governmental issues, respected them for their works, their accomplishments in the domain of brain, and their standing as academics. (Azad, *Musalman aur Congress*, n.d, p. 59)

The Nationalist Muslims were exceptionally vocal and their voice was enhanced by the Congress Press. Without Muslim Press, political publicity in India was a Congress restraining infrastructure. This amplified their job and gave them exposure which was messed up with regards to their significance. Partnership with Congress presented to them another bit of leeway. They were or if nothing else professed to be, enemies of colonialists, and this made for mainstream offer. Their public picture was upgraded by their enemy of British promulgation, by their support in no-co-activity crusades, and by resulting detainment. For an incredible mass of individuals in India, legislative issues implied resistance to the British and the suffering of detainment. The Nationalist Muslims satisfied these capabilities thus rose in the open assessment. The Congress Muslim average used to insult the Muslim Leaguers by saying, "What kind of pioneer is your Jinnah who has never been to jail" (Aziz, *The Making of Pakistan: A Study in Nationalism*, 1967, p. 29).

Another factor working for their potential benefit was their religious appeal to the majority. It is an incongruity of history that while Congress consistently accused the Muslim League of bringing religion into governmental issues and consequently promising response, it was Congress Muslims whose whole famous help among the Muslim masses was established in religion. Azad's legislative issues were not adequate even to a little part of Muslims, yet he was regarded and appreciated for his religious works (Azad, *India Wins Freedom: An Autobiographical Narrative*, 1959, p. 77). Hussain Ahmad Madani and his Deobandi partners had no sense in governmental issues, however, in certain territories, they told submission as religious heads of a specific way of thinking. Ansari and Ajmal Khan had no political approach among Muslims, however, in the *Khilafaat* days, their star was in the ascendant. In Muslim social orders, it has consistently been to win mainstream approval by making religion an issue. This clarifies the grasp of the Nationalist Muslims on firm Muslim circles; then again, the way that even this religious allure neglected to win famous help clarifies the steadfast doubt of the incredible lion's share of Muslims in each one of the individuals who aligned themselves with the Congress. (Azad, *Musalman aur Congress*, n.d, p. 83)

Conclusion

The above discussion leads to the conclusion that K.K. Aziz's historical work has been done with the utmost diligence and concluded that '*Muslim Nationalism*' in South Asia did not grow and emerged in an emptiness. Two forces amalgamated to give birth to it. One of them was the Muslim sensation of autonomy; the other was the role of Congress in defiance to the Muslim problem as a whole. Congress's accountability for the formation and inspiration of Muslim separation lies in the circumstance that it did not grow a strategy to switch the Muslims. It made no exertion to persuade the Muslim masses of the goodness of its brand of nationalism. While the attitude of the Muslim League was reactionary according to the desire of the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent. It is clear from the comparison that the idea of Muslim Nationalism was more subjective than territorial, more psychological than political while the Nationalist Muslims was the supporter of Indian or Hindu nationalism, which was more territorial than cultural, more historical than religious. This difference in approach was fundamental.

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