



RESEARCH PAPER

Insurgency in Afghanistan: Challenge to Liberal Peace and State Building

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PAPER INFO	ABSTRACT
Received: January 02, 2020 Accepted: March 15, 2020 Online: March 30, 2020	The insurgency in Afghanistan continues to be an ongoing predicament that the afghan government and the international community continue to face. The insurgency has various underlying and immediate causes. The paper focuses the on the Post Liberal framework that had suggests that the one size fit all approach of liberal peace is no longer sufficient to address the realities on ground in cases like Afghanistan. the post liberal peace thus suggests in the inclusion of civil society and cases by case policy making to suit the circumstances. The paper opts a qualitative approach to study the cause and effect relationship of insurgency and state building. The most prominent cause of the Afghan insurgency is the failure of state building under the Liberal Peace Framework; these practices in Afghanistan have further aggravated the conflict. The cause and effect relationship thus developed is such that the insurgency undermines state building and the state building intensified the insurgency. Therefore, the case of Afghanistan suggests that the use of Post Liberal Peace can provide a workable solution of the Afghan Insurgency and creation of a sustainable peace
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Introduction

The insurgency in Afghanistan has further deteriorated the already fragile state and society. Several decades of war left the state dwindling and exhausted struggling to survive. The Russian invasion 1979, the US invasions 2001, the era of the war lords and the civil wars have left Afghanistan in turmoil for the past 40 years. Insurgency and Terrorism has been a common feature in these phases. The writ of the government their legitimacy to practice power and the control of the state has forever been contested. Insurgents and Ruling governments have

opposing ideologies; they challenge exactly what they seek, stability, control, legitimacy and power. State building as a concept encompasses all of these characteristics, and it is a challenge to pursue in case of Afghanistan.

Though the concept of nation building and state building are distinctive, one cannot be achieved without the other, the aim of both is peace. The first depends on civic nationalism and the second depends of ethnic nationalism. Insurgents challenge state building as they undermine the process of nation building and peace building. Insurgents induce conflicts in peripheral areas to challenge the writ of the government and show people that the current regime is unworthy of their trust and is therefore incapable of handling the affairs of the state. The insurgency thus is conducted to undermine the process of state building whether being led by the internal domestic actors or by external international stake holders through institutional mechanisms.

The violence employed in an insurgency is unprecedented in the 21st century. The conflicts of Afghanistan and Iraq are examples of such a scenario. Since the end of World War II Terrorism and Guerrilla warfare have been prevalent. Several ethnicities/ nations have opted for violence as a means for their self-determination. Scholars have traced several causes of insurgency and terrorism, they site colonial past, ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial grievances, economic marginalization, effective imperial policies, ineffective governance and prevalent economic imbalance and competition among communities as common causes. these reason due to which people revolt against the state or the empire have shaped the 20th century and has continued well into the 21st century.

In such an environment peace seems like the least likely outcome, as insurgency evades the chances of state building that are the priority of the international stake holders in Afghanistan. Hence the frame of international Liberal peace that includes state building is continuously under threat in Afghanistan.

This paper adopts a Qualitative approach and analyzes the cause and effect relationship of insurgency and state building in Afghanistan. The paper analyses liberal peace framework as a cause of insurgency in Afghanistan and therefore highlights the significance of the post liberal peace framework in dealing with the situation. The paper will thus highlight the various factors that contributed towards an insurgency due to the failure of state building and how the insurgency is a challenge to state building because it keeps the people divided and the Socio-economic issues remain unresolved. Largely due to weak governance, religious/ethnic differences and the lack of trust among those governing and the governed along with the contested role of external powers.

The paper is divided into further sections, Section 1 Includes the critique of the Post Liberal Peace Framework and the highlights the practice of Liberal Peace. Section 2 Focuses on the Insurgency as a concept that has engulfed the conflict zones. Section 3 sheds light on the situation in Afghanistan that has been marred by

the imposition of liberal peace framework. Its focuses on the state building practices that have been under challenge due to the Afghan insurgency.

Section 1

Post Liberal International Peace Framework -State Building

The post liberal peace framework operates through an understanding of the correct relationship between state, society and people, and institutions that are conducive for peaceful circumstances and development. The basis of this model is that it cannot emerge without good governance, human rights, rule of law, market economy and democratic institutions as these institutions ensure accountability. It requires Social integration and socio-economic independence in the market. This combination can lead to development, to resolve conflicts, poverty, under development and the re- occurrence of war and violence. Post Liberal peace requires the inclusive civic- secular and cosmopolitan framework identity. The key component is the civil society in this process this will require a lot of restricting at the grass roots level. Something, that is not always welcomed by the local population. While the liberal peace framework rests upon the liberal concepts of institutionalism, internationalism, democratic peace thesis, free trade, international law and a balance between freedoms and regulations and to top it all of a liberal social contract. "in academic terms it is related to peace building and state building that signify in Wilsonian terms the processes, actors and technologies associated with humanitarian intervention" (p559) there are four strands of Liberal Peace Framework they are Victors peace, the institutional peace, constitutional peace and Civil peace. They combine to form a model. Within these the civil peace is perhaps the most important, it is derived from the approach of direct action, citizen advocacy m mobilization, attainment or defense of basic human rights values. This within a liberal peace connect indicates individual agency within international organizations rather than market agency. "Many subjects of recent state building experiments regard the liberal peace as an ideology that degrades into violence because its universal aspirations are not mirrored on the ground (Richmond, 2013, p. 562)

Liberal peace has though created more division among the people as is see in the case of Afghanistan . "this has led to hierarchical tensions within civil society as both the concept and policy tool, between those civic secular identities acceptable to liberal order and "certain kinds of associational life" such as ethnic religious identity which must "be reworked or even eliminated"(William and Young 2012). The divergence of thought, becomes evident. Such a model or framework aims for the practice of civic nationalism - when civic values are prioritized above the national or ethnic ones. This modernist thought, that the liberal peace framework represents is a universal all size fit approach that cannot provide solutions for the complexities on the ground. State building is both a narrow version of peacebuilding and peace formation. The first is required for formation of institutions and security and the other is a vital course of local legitimacy for

international norms and interests that both the concept of state building and peace building represent (Richmond, 2013, p. 18).

Consequently, this Liberal Peace Framework comes under critique by scholars of critical approaches such as realist, liberal, political economy, structural and post-colonial, they criticize that this model as firstly, the colonial self-imposed mission to civilize, secondly creates dependency and thirdly the emergence of sovereign states if not handled will emerge as a threat to the global liberal order (Dzelilovic, Kostovicova & Ramton, 2014).

Defining State Building

State building is an externalized process, with organizations, donors, agencies and INGO's they play a key role in building liberal institutions for security, democracy, economy and creating a basic infrastructure that supports it all. It is biased ideologically towards neo liberalism and self help in the economic realm and requires significant security capacity. This also means that the state that comes into being is externally depend for more than just basic security but also for capacity (Richmond, 2013). Francis Fukuyama, defines state building as the establishment, reestablishment and strengthening of a public structure in a given territory capable of delivering public goods. (Fukuyama 2004).

According to Dzelilovic et al (2014) the following are essential components of state building:

- **Sovereignty:** undisputed claims over the territory, monopoly over the legitimate use of forces with concentration on collective power.
- **Legitimacy:** sources of legitimacy in the purpose and balancing between governance and the governed
- **Accountability:** of the government officials and those responsible for proving to the governed.
- **Ownership:** the people see the government as their own

The existence of all four may be termed as state building being pursued by the International actors involved in the process. "State building, like liberal or neoliberal peace building is failed by Design" (Richmond, 2013, p.2). The institutional framework is designed externally by the European in an individualistic context that does not include ground realities like the economic circumstances of the people. Secondly they lack the utilization of a specific context, they operate through institutions, donors, and INGO's based in the western states. as a result of these problems state building and peace building strategies fail to connect with their target populations. This further creates problems when the buttressing elites take advantage of the situation for their own agendas (Richmond, 2013).

Section 2

Insurgency as an Ongoing Struggle: Challenges State Building

“An insurgency reflects a process of state building, where insurgents compete to provide governance to the population “(Jones, 2008: p17). As post conflict states and societies focus on these components. In Afghanistan the international State Building under the Liberal Peace framework that is at the heart of the Afghanistan problem. The Taliban have continuously demanded the removal of international armed forces from Afghanistan, sighting that the practices of state building are foreign in nature. The investment made by the stakeholder’s gives them more control over the state and the people. Therefore, the acceptance of the state building framework has never been accepted in Afghanistan as the role of foreign powers is criticized. The retaliation to this has been the insurgency in Afghanistan that does not own the state building norms of accountability, ownership, legitimacy and sovereignty. These practices are the ones that insurgents challenge as territories remain divided based on ethnic affiliations and tribalism. The legitimacy of the government is constantly challenged, accountability is disputed and the ownership lacks as the insurgents have felt excluded from the process and therefore challenge the current regime.

Defining an Insurgency

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA, 1980, p. 2) Defines an “ an Insurgency is a political military campaign by non-state actors who seek to overthrow a government or secede from a country through the use of conventional and sometimes unconventional military strategies or tactics”. Insurgency is a basic struggle for influence and control, from a position of relative weakness. The insurgency prevails dissatisfied with the status quo. It is organized subversion and violence to nullify and seize, political control of a region (FM 3 -24). Prominent scholars like David Galula states that an “insurgency can involve a wide range of tactics, from small scale public demonstrations to large scale violence” (Galula, 1964, p. 3). The broad spectrum approach of an insurgency gives way to several tactics and strategies to be employed to achieve the goals of the insurgents that is primality to over the current government in favor of their own. Modern day insurgencies are complicated and function through an intricate web placed within the society. Galula (1964) states that there are two major cause of insurgency as history has points to the rise of nationalism and communism. The fall of colonial and the rise of neocolonialism have only furthered their cause. With that the involvement of foreign sates has made matters worse for the home states. the outside powers manipulate the situation of a country faced with an insurgency for pragmatic or long term interests this furls the insurgency while the state struggles desperately with a counter insurgency strategy. Galula (1964) has thus decodes the features of an insurgency in an attempt to develop a better Counter insurgency strategy.

Various forms of Insurgency

Scholars like Brad O'Neil (2006) state that insurgency is a struggle between the ruling and the non-ruling group, through the use of political resources (propaganda and demonstrations) and violence to sustain or to destroy, the legitimacy of the government. The author further describes various forms of an insurgency that include the anarchist, egalitarian and traditionalist, Apocalyptic-Utopian, reformist and preservationist, commercialist. The author also highlights that sometimes the goal of the insurgent groups vary along with that means that they employ to pursue their goals. The means and ends therefore must complement each other for an effective insurgency to take place. The strategy of the insurgents will also vary based on the means employed and the ends being aimed. The four strategies discussed is the strategy of protracted popular war that is a military strategy. Insurgency, guerilla warfare, revolutionary and terrorists are terms that have been used interchangeably used by scholars in International Relations. The techniques of gaining popular support include the charismatic attraction associated primarily with the leader, the Esoteric Appeals and the exoteric appeals both of these are used, the fear and impact of external exploitation and the later refers the exploitation of the grievance of the masses. Where such appeals of public manipulation and mass mobilization fail, terrorism is employed to gain results intended the creation of fear. Thus brings the masses to submission, the government's response in turn is provoked against the insurgent groups that challenge the legitimacy and the writ of the government. The government's response borders on aggression as it is not forgotten easily by the people it sows the seeds of hatred among the affected population that face the burnt as collateral damage, towards the governments in power (O'Neill, 2006; Muzaffar, et al, 2019)

Section 3

Afghanistan: the Pursuit of State Building since 2001

Theoretically it has been daunting to categorize the rise of insurgency in Afghanistan. Scholars have debated the cause of an insurgency through the prism of grievances theories and ethnic differences. Insurgency in Afghanistan has both internal and external causes, the internal causes can be traced as ethnic differences, ethnic nationalism, religious affiliation, sectarian differences, ethnic marginalization, political instability and weak governance at all levels. External factors have also contributed to insurgency in Afghanistan, given the dynamic of the 21st century, the war on terror made Afghanistan a theatre of war, where extremist groups rivalries, great power politics and regional rivalries have plagued the land. Afghanistan being the graveyard of empires as historians claim has become a quick sand for regional powers and non-state actors alike. Eventually both internal and external factors contribute towards the rise of insurgency in Afghanistan time and again.

According to Seth Jones (2008) IR scholars often differentiate domestic politics from the international politics based on their structures. Domestically, governmental institutions are used to establish law and order. Internationally, the

world is anarchic in nature. The author is of the view that this dichotomy is not always right as states are sometimes weak and unable to provide for the population, such as good governance. As a result anarchy prevails and insurgency is more likely. Additionally, in Afghanistan, the cause of an insurgency is an ideology, not just the greed and grievances of the people. Several structural preconditions exist for the on-set of the afghan insurgency:

- Overthrow of the Taliban government
- Weak system of governance
- Lack of provision of services to the population
- Weak rule of law and order
- Fewer number of international forces to fill gaps after the fall of the Taliban

Given this predicament we see that the state building practices have been insufficient and ineffective in creating the institutions required for effective governance. The externalized state building process has not met the requirements of the grass roots level. Therefore, ineffective governance practices prevail and continue to leave loopholes.

Insurgency in Afghanistan

Max Weber defined a state as a community that possesses claims to use force within a given territory (Lottholz & Lemay-Hebert, 2016). Conflict is a result of the action of the insurgents aiming to seize power, by splitting the existing country and over-throwing the government. The insurgent's agenda to initiate a war is to their discretion at any time or at any place, they initiate the conflict. They intend to capitalize on the societal, economic and ethnic differences among the people. Counter insurgency is the response strategy adopted by the state or the government against the agenda of the insurgents. Thus igniting tug of war for power and legitimacy between the government forces and the insurgent groups.

The soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 left many things undone after the Geneva Accords. The 1980's saw the emergence of the mujahedeen that waged war against the Soviets/ Communists in Afghanistan. The US government had also played a significant role through the CIA to provide assistance of the mujahedeen groups. In 1989 the soviets left, the soviet backed government also fell to the Mujahedeen in 1992. The Mujahedeen then took control of Afghanistan, through a rotating presidency mechanism. This era of the 1990's became known as the warlords' era, it was marred by a civil war, where the struggle for power was seen. The Taliban entered the scene in 1994 and captured the city of Kabul by 1996. Throughout their tenure the Taliban faced a lot of resistance from the people, though their popularity was short lived.

The Northern Alliance was their main opposition. These years of civil war left legacies in Afghanistan such as a ongoing of conflict, civil war, and oppressive tactics to maintain or manage peace all due to a population that followed tribal loyalties and was ethnically confined to their territories of Influence. Hundreds died in the civil war, displacement was a common feature, governance institutions were ineffective and the infrastructure was badly destroyed. The deteriorating state and society of Afghanistan entered another phase of turmoil. After 9/11 events, Afghanistan came under fire for hosting Osama bin laden at the time and the eventually the launch of the US intervention in Afghanistan that aggravated the fall of the already dwindling state of Afghanistan (Dale, 2011; Fritz & Menocal, 2007). The Afghan have been at war for almost 40 years, with a conflict ongoing. Within the decade of 1980's 7% to 9% of the Afghan population died by 1989. Civil war had resumed throughout the 1990's era of warlords and the Taliban rise through more deconstruction and deaths. In 2001 the over throw of the Taliban by the US invasion opened a new era of war. More than 2000 American soldiers have been killed in Afghanistan a cost of \$ 840 billion. In varying degrees 41 countries contributed in the war. (Goepner , 2018, p.2). In 2001 after the overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan a rebellion emerged, it developed into a large scale insurgency by 2006. A drastic increase in violence was seen in these years (Johnson and Mason 2007). The US generals were of the opinion to keep a light footing of US forces Afghanistan. In 2005 the ratios of US troops were 1 for, 1000 inhabitants in Kabul (Jones, 2008, p. 24). Hence the gap in policing increased the insurgency in Afghanistan had surged in 2006 and 2007 increased US troops arrived in 2008 in Iraq and Afghanistan to deal with this rise.

Currently, the situation in Afghanistan is worst then in the past, the insurgent Taliban have more control of the area and the number of afghan deaths and casualties is scaled in thousands. The following Charts, published in the New York Times article suggest that the Taliban are in control of more areas and the ration of Afghan forces to Taliban is imbalanced as the Taliban are in larger numbers.




Figure 1 : The maps show the Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan as reported by the US government (left) and the estimates of the military analyst (right)

Source: Norland, R., Ngu, A., & Abed, F. (2018, September 8). *How the US Government Misleads the Public on Afghanistan* . Retrieved from New York Times : <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/09/08/world/asia/us-misleads-on-afghanistan.htm>




Figure 2 : this shows the ratio of Afghan forces to the Taliban insurgents , with estimates from both US government and the Afghan officials.

Source: Norland, R., Ngu, A., & Abed, F. (2018, September 8). *How the US Government Misleads the Public on Afghanistan*. Retrieved from New York Times : <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/09/08/world/asia/us-misleads-on-afghanistan.htm>

Religious and Ethnic Affiliations/ Rivalries

The Taliban were influenced by the Deoband school of thought, a conservative Islamic orthodoxy with a Salafist egalitarian model. This model developed in Dar ul Ulum, Deoband, India, 1867, they became known as the legal scholars. This interpretation of Islam holds that a Muslim's primary obligation and loyalties lie with his religion. Social caste systems are opposed within Islam, loyalty to the country is secondary. They believe in the obligation to protect fellow Muslims and to do jihad. This obligation alone explains some of the affiliations the two prominent leaders Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden shared. Many analysts believe that if the Taliban had remained in power they would have propagated and exported this ideology to neighboring states like Uzbekistan, as they had embraced the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan against the Uzbek regime at the time. Hizb - i - Islami and Harakat - i - Inqilab - i - Islami were among those accepted into the Taliban brotherhood (Dale, 2011).

Afghanistan is a country 50% Pashtun, and smaller percentage of Hazaras Tajiks, Uzbeks and other ethnic groups (Jones, 2008). Ethnic combatants are very committed to their cause. Horowitz establishes that there is a likelihood of ethnic violence being U shaped that is violence is less likely in highly homogenized and highly reorganized countries and more likely in countries with ethnic majority and small ethnic minorities. (Horowitz, 1985) "Afghanistan truly is a zero-sum game. Anytime anyone advances all other consider this to be at their expense" (Brentsen and Pezzullo, 2005; p 219,) The ethnic and religious grievances also incite an insurgency, the tensions among communities may leave them prone to insurgency and civil war. Ethnicity or religion can also lead to polarization. The rhetoric of hyper nationalism can also lead to "ethnic fractionalization" that becomes a significant tangent in the civil war, and that democracy is negatively related to the incidence of civil war. Though the intensity of this may vary from case to case.

Tribalism in Afghanistan is an ethno - linguistic group, giving primacy to rise of kinships and patrilineal descent. The tribe is a kind of a union of mutual assistance, with members cooperating on defense and maintaining order. The Taliban are neither a simple Pashtun movement nor even a Pan-ghilzai movement, though their geographic influence may suggest. They are largely a single tribe. Tribal feuds remain fresh in the minds of the tribe's men, though these disputes are centuries old. Tribalism has thus played an important part in the insurgency in Afghanistan where tribes favor their men and prioritize control over their lands and find ways to undermine control of other tribes on their lands. Rivalries among the tribes thus divide the people further. The Taliban as Tribal movement has managed tribal institutions, especially in the eastern mountains that is associated with the

Ghilzai Pashtuns. These areas include the northern district of Oruzgan Province, Zabol Province, Paktika, Paktya, Gardez, Wardak and Logar. Tribes Durrani, Ghilzai, ghurghusht, Karlanri and Sarbani - five tribal confederation of Pashtuns each of the single ancestors (Dale, 2011). The primordial values of the people keep them in a tight loop.

Several factors have contributed to the division of ethnicities among the Afghan people. These have only been highlighted and manipulated in successive regimes and time periods. Gilles Dorronsoro (2009), describes in his Carnegie Endowment Report that

- The Pashtun enjoy the top position of the ethnic hierarchy, non Pashtun ethnic groups, the Hazars, the Tajiks, and the Uzbeks were empowered. After 1992 the fall of Najeebullah government, ended the virtual peace and allowed for other groups and political parties to establish political base.
- The sectarian conflicts and communal conflicts resonate throughout the country. In particular the Afghan media has played a major role in expanding the geographical scope of such conflicts. Media has played a largely negative role in this process.
- Finally, the Pashtuns and other groups are diverging due to the Afghan state and the international community. Their dissatisfaction has created problems, as they regard the Afghan government to be puppets of western powers. Such mistrust is not limited to the government but also to neighboring states that the Pashtun believe have an agenda towards their ethnicity. The suspicion of the intensification of the neighboring states has been due to the missed opportunity at the Bonn Agreement in 2001 when they could have been stakeholders and partners in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Afghanistan. This would have made them more responsible towards the state of Afghanistan (Weinbaum 2006).

Weak Governance in Afghanistan

Seth Jones (2008) focuses on the issues of the governance that create anarchy at the domestic level the failure of the structure creates anarchy. There are two major problems in the regard: The government is unable to provide for its people, as the structure is weak. The improper functioning and the corrupt untamed bureaucrats create a sense of chaos than order.

Poor governance, thus leads to an insurgency as the state is incapable of managing its periphery and the policing structures collapse under the pressure of statelessness and anarchy. Organizationally and institutionally weak governance leaves gaps for an insurgency to develop. This allows the insurgents to assume the role of state like structures that eventually become a challenge for the central

government. The GDP is also seen as a major factor as it correlated to financially, organizationally, and politically a weakly managed government systems and countries with a poorly governed mountainous range also associated to government spending in that region. There is strong evidence though to support this argument. Therefore, the authors establish a pertinent link between, terrain and insurgency. These have been common causes of an insurgency after the cold war (Dale, 2011). The fiscal capacity of the state of Afghanistan is seen with the low extraction and distribution of the state. The tax revenue increased from 4% to 10 % from 2004 to 2015. In the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) the share of the revenue is low (Bizhan , 2018). The liberal peace framework propagated by the West focused on economic development, though state building will require more security and a properly functioning judicial system to provide people with justice (Dorronsoro, 2009).

State Building and the Crisis of Legitimacy

The liberal peace is in a crisis of legitimacy, as this peace is considered foreign and insensitive towards the subjects (Richmond, 2009). The critique of Liberal Peace Framework focuses on the flaws in practice. Beatrice Pouligny (2005) argues that the stories of the local population have been overlook by the practitioners of peace who have focused on a one size fit all approach. Their state-centric approach, elite bargaining processes and formal institutions have yielded unsatisfactory results. Pouligny emphasizes the subjectivities of the locale, while highlighting limits of the Liberal Peace Framework establishes the need to examine the complexities of societies from below, in sensitive post conflict societies. She emphasizes that peace cannot come from above.

Consequently, the critics of Liberal Peace thus understand the dynamic forces behind the resistance that is experienced everyday by the practitioner of Liberal Peace. This superficial approach leads to people rising against the external forms of governance that are imposed on people. Such has been the case with Yugoslavia and Afghanistan. "Peace is co-opted by unrepresentative elites or nationalist entrepreneurs in which community enter into a spiral of long lasting confrontation". The division of the people is manipulated and utilized. Although critics to post Liberal Peace state that the effort to develop a bottom up approach are insufficient, as the recent talks of local ownership are only doing lip service (Ginty and Richmond , 2013). The world international society advocates for the ownership of state building and capacity building but it forces implementation of the western style liberal values. This is paradoxically a challenge for the policy makers (Shinoda, 2018).

The case of Afghanistan has highlighted the various flaws of state building practices. the pursuit of sovereignty, legitimacy, accountability and ownership as components of state building based on Liberal values have only brought about more division the analysis in case of Afghanistan that is evident is that the post liberal peace framework though in its initial stage of development has more

prospects than its predecessor. The fact that Afghanistan still faces an insurgency that has only strengthened with time bring us to assume that the people have and will contest the imposition of state building led by external actors. The bottom up approach has to be adopted where the civil society becomes a part of the peace process. A process that is initiated from within the country. Insurgents in Afghanistan challenge the **sovereignty** of the state, as the governments constantly struggles to establish control over territory ,**legitimacy** of the government also comes under debate and the legitimacy of the afghan officials tis challenged by the insurgents who believe that they are puppets of the external powers. The **accountability** of the government is a big question , who is to be held accountable under what system, the tribal or the establish judicial . the **ownership** of the entire process is contested as the people feel excluded from the establishing of peace. The civil society feels unrepresented as the country remains divided into factions and groups.

Conclusion

State building under the frame work of Liberal Peace has been underway in Afghanistan for almost two decades yet the results are not as satisfactory as aimed by the stakeholders. The liberal values that are imposed and necessitated by the external powers has alienated the people. The post liberal peace framework, takes the crises of state building further by suggesting an increased role of the people to ensure ownership and accountability that would establish legitimacy and sovereignty of the state and government. In the same way the post liberal peace abandons the one size fit all approach to ensure the continuation and sustainability of state building practices. The results are expected to be more conducive. However, some scholar's claims that even this practice of state building under the post liberal peace framework does not hold all the answers. The case of Afghanistan is cited as the stage and experiment of liberal peace framework in the 21st century. Afghanistan has seen war for over 40 years, the insurgency since the early 2000's has only grown in size. With all this, the crisis of governance has led the state of Afghanistan into further turmoil. The insurgents have divided the state into territories of influence and they continue to challenge the writ of the government and the external factors supporting the afghan government. The insurgents have retaliated against the weak practices of liberal peace that do not fit the ground realities. The situation in Afghanistan is thus a lesson that the post liberal peace practices should be adopted in such a way that the people and society of Afghanistan can become a part of the peace process. Policies must vary from case to case, the flexibility of the approach towards state budding, nation building and capacity building is the only way states like Afghanistan can acquire peace and work towards a stable functioning sovereign state.

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