



RESEARCH PAPER

**Pakistan United States Strategic and Nuclear Ties during Zia
Regime 1979-1988**

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ABSTRACT

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Present article is an analysis of progressing trilateral relationship Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the United States. After an era of Pakistan strong-arming to join the United States lead war terror, This Era from 1977 to 1988 was very important in the history of the World as well as Pakistan U.S associations. Pakistan is the core as well as the explanations. United States policymakers have come to realize that without Pakistan's support, it is not the potential to fight uprising that overlaps the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan Army and ISI informed ties with the militants, history will tell whether Pakistan will graduate to be a long term strategic partner of the United States. For time being, the end game appears to be reconciliations. With the rebellious and the exit of the United States forces from Afghanistan, Whether the Pakistan Military establishment will use its leverage over the Afghan and Taliban to help peace to the region or not remain nuclear. Historical president word Zia ul Haq to jimmy carter president United States. We did not need the peanut because of Pakistan's huge support and loss on the Afghanistan USSR war. To some extent, it depends on other players and whether they will continue to play a zero-sum game

Introduction

On July 15, 1977, Zia met with Bhutto, who was being held on some comfortable government rest hours in the 6,000-foot, fir-tree-covered hill station of Murree that time, just an hour's drive from Islamabad. Assuming that they had

been still running the country; Bhutto imprudently chastised Zia for imposing martial law and reminded him that the 2nd constitution called for the death penalty for anyone trying to overthrow the government (Wolpert, 1993). The General listened politely, said that he had intervened reluctantly, would remain neutral, and would hold fair elections, after which he would "revert to the barracks leaving the field free to you to manage the affairs of state as you consider appropriate" (Arif, 1995). Two weeks later, when Zia released the former prime minister with the other political prisoners from custody, it looked as though the Generals sincerely planned toward instruction the state for simply a short-term *passé*. If so the public's tumultuous reception for Bhutto jolted their thinking. Once free, the ex-prime minister sharply criticized the imposition of martial law and demonstrated that his popularity with the masses remained undiminished (Kux, 2001, p. 117). A wildly enthusiastic reception welcomed Bhutto in Karachi. In Lahore, an immense number of people moved to greet him. It seemed likely that the PPP would win the upcoming elections.

Although Zia and his colleagues may not have planned to maintain power the likelihood of a Bhutto victory undoubtedly helped convince them to stay on. Assumed the ex-prime minister's disapproval of the army exploits his roadway record for cruelty in allocating with challengers was somewhat harsh in treatment. Bhutto came again. The martial laws regime then swiftly as smelled a good deal of legal charges against Bhutto, maintaining that it remained taken aback by suggestion initiate informal records of illegal misuse of, power. The purpose was to eradicate Bhutto from the political stage (Arif, 1995). When Zia turned to power Pak US relations were spinning out downward. After the stunning election victory of the Janata Party and the end to Indira Gandhi's despotic rule, India was once more the world's largest democracy. While Ziaul Haq turns into his state's army autocrat, the India-Pakistan contrast was even more marked. With its highlighting on encouraging democracy and social moralities, the US President Carter direction watched on India through covering favoritisms and on Pakistan with suspicions. Washington was also trying to build up relations with the "local dominant state". South Asia that means India, not Pakistan. July 1977 US President Jimmy Carter welcomed India's new Head of Government Morarji Desai to the White House.

On January 1, 1978 Jimmy Carter came to be the third US President to go to an official visit to India. Unlike Eisenhower and Nixon, he did not stop in Pakistan (India, 1993). In dealing with foreign affairs, Zia followed Bhutto's approach, but in a less flamboyant manner. Aziz Ahmed, who was regarded as too close to the former prime minister, was dropped from the office of foreign minister. Agha Shahi, the proficient diplomat who had been serving as foreign secretary, became his descendant with the title of "foreign affairs adviser. Nor did Zia alter the course on the nuclear issue. While government unit atomic expert Joseph Nye visits Pakistan Capital Islamabad in September 1977, he brought only sticks after Washington had withdrawn the principal carrot - the offer to sell A-7 attack bombers. Nye cautioned the Government of Pakistan is that if they continued with

the French energy reprocessing, plan the United States would have to cut off financial aid under Glenn modification to the external assist act. The amendment excluded US aid to nations that did not agree to the nuclear Limitation Agreement but that traded in nuclear fuel reprocessing technology (Kerr, 2012).

The reality is that Pakistan had granted to extraordinary international protections made little impression on US atomic specialists; they continued to be convinced that Islamabad wanted the reprocessing facility to be able to match India's nuclear explosive capability. Zia informed Nye that his country intended to process with the project. Quite apart from strategic considerations, Pakistan's military dictator had little choice on an issue that had become charged with nationalist pride.

After Zia refused to bend, the US government proceeded to suspend economic assistance. With aid levels running at about \$50 million annually, considerably less than during the halcyon days of the early 1960s, the economic blow was not enormous. Washington, in any case, continued a substantial food aid program that the Glenn amendment did not bar. The political blow was nonetheless pointed one. The cooling of Pak-US ties equated the warming inclination in the US-India relationship. Although the Carter administration failed to dissuade Islamabad, it fared better in Paris. After French President, Valery Giscard D'Estaing dropped Gaullist Jacques Chirac as Prime Minister. Paris decided to shift its policy and informed Washington that it would not be unhappy if the reprocessing plant project were terminated (Weissman & Krosney, 1981). To put a better face on things, the French proposed a technical modification called "co-processing" that would permit the production of fuel Usable in a nuclear power reactor but not in making a bomb.

When French nuclear expert Andre Jaconet Visited Pakistan in February 1978 Zia rejected the recommended substitutes. At this point, Jaconet recalled, the French become "convinced Pakistan craved the nuclear bomb" And decide definitively to back out of the contract (Tahir-Kheli, 1982). For Washington, the French action appeared to mark an important nonproliferation victory and to remove the major source of friction in bilateral relations with Pakistan. A much delighted National Department declared that the United States will be continuing financial assistance and seeking \$69 million for the next financial year program (Tahir-Kheli, 1982). But the smiles did not last long. US officials soon became aware that Pakistan was secretly pursuing a parallel, but technically more difficult, a path toward a bomb: the uranium enrichment process (Jain, 2007). In the spring of 1978, Western governments realized that something was amiss after the British discovered that Pakistan was trying to buying inverters, a key component about Pakistan's concealed endeavor to produce enriched uranium. Zia responded with a straight face when asked about, that's ridiculous. Your figures are wrong. We have abolished this setup gave me detail of any place in Pakistan in which you need to refer your specialists and I will allow them to come and see". The ambassador was cynical that Zia would trail that he was right.

On April 6, 1979, two days after ex-prime minister Z.A Bhutto's execution State Department, inveterate that the US once further floating aid to Pakistan for of the nuclear-power program. Washington had hoped to avoid publicizing the re-imposition of sanctions but felt obligated to take action public because of media leaks (Ganguly & Hagerty, 2012). To Bhutto's banging, some experts in Pakistan presumed that the United States was punishing president Pakistan Zia for slighting Jimmy Carter's requests for kindness. Pakistan's president knew that this was not the case. One month before later the US CIA community have decided that Pakistan was secretly pursuing the developed uranium pathway concerning atomic explosive competence, Deputy Secretary of US State Warren Christopher stopped in Islamabad during a trip abroad to alert General Zia Ul Haq to the potential renewed postponement of assistance. Christopher had warned that the US would have to take this action, according to the Symington amendment, to the foreign assistance act if US President Carter acknowledged "trustworthy guarantees" that Pakistan was not regarding for an atomic weapon. Pakistan President Zia prompt "guaranteed" Christopher that this program, was "completely politically" and rejected to rule out a "peaceful atomic test and was unwilling to agree to intercontinental protections on Pakistan's atomic facilities.

US president Jimmy carter's government find Pakistan President Zia's answered too little and postponed financial assistance a second time. In the hope of minimizing damage to bilateral relations, at first, no announcement was made of the action (Thornton, 1982). Blaming the renewed imposition of sanctions on "Zionist circles," (Kux, 2000) the Pakistanis were especially rankled that Washington had taken no action against India, which had in reality exploded a nuclear device. For form punishing, New Delhi, the Carter administration to the announcement of Islamabad was occupied in a determined and diplomatically expensive clash to remain the resource of developed uranium fuel, for the atomic power devices at Tarpaper near Bombay. Such a supper level Pakistani put it "If the United States needed realistic supports against, the Indians we will not have willing stop much. Pakistan could realize US preferential toward, Israel as an extraordinary case but not the rebuff to agreement India while hitting, so hard at Pakistan". In consultations with visiting US Pakistani officials, frequently insisted much as president Zia had "guaranteed" Christopher that the atomic program, was completely peaceful. For example, in August 1979 External Relationships Adviser Shahi told visiting, member of Congress, Lester Wolff (DNY) that, Pakistan "no purpose to create atomic bomb" and chased a peaceful program to gain knowledge of nuclear energy for electric power generation. Shahi labeled press reports that Libya and the other Muslim Arab States were finically funding the nuclear program to make an "Islamic bomb" as pure imaginary (Spohr & Reynolds, 2016).

In a Similar stratum (Richter & Gustafson, 1980) as the US President, Jimmy Carter's government discovered ways to stop Pakistan's atomic program with the power of the International atomic agency group supervision of arms control

expert, Gerard Smith, found few promising opportunities. When the New York Times reported, that Smith group, considered, along with other possibilities the option of destroying Pakistan's nuclear capability by an attack on the Kohouta uranium enrichment facility, the story caused pandemonium in Islamabad.

A clear-cut United State Representative rejection was unsuccessful to calm the waters. Few months before in June 1979, Pakistan's thrilling compassion about the Kahuta capability had affected a humiliating political occasion. Two French representatives from the French embassy in Pakistan Capital Islamabad, the ambassador, and the first secretary driving the car in the locality of Kahuta, late a meeting of European community diplomats. While their car was going on a public road and was not in a controlled zone, two cars rapidly jammed the Diplomat path. Pakistanis security members stopped diplomats from their cars and beat them. French The first secretary Jean Forlot, said the United State embassy in Islamabad then he expected that Pakistani unclear management planned the attack to Diplomat people keep away from the restricted

area around the nuclear facility (Nasr, 1994). In October 1979, Shahi traveled to Washington for a further round of discussions. After the Communist takeover in Afghanistan and the fall of the shah in Iran, the Pakistanis hoped that the US would show greater sensitivity to the altered security environment in the region and dwell less heavily on the nuclear issue. But Shahi perceived little change in the US attitude. Although the Carter administration recognized the desirability of improving ties with Pakistan, Shahi found that the Americans were unwilling to soft-pedal the nuclear issue and continued to regard Zia's military dictatorship with distaste, especially after Bhutto's execution. While his envoy was in Washington, Pakistan's president announced an indefinite postponement of elections. The State Department responded sternly that the action "deeply disappointed" the United States (Kux, 2000). The Carter administration was also disbelieving about Zia's efforts to gain greater domestic legitimacy through his policy of Islamization (Muzaffar, et. al, 2017).

In the process, Zia substituted traditional Qur'anic punishments for western legal norms, promoted religious schools (Madrasshas), and established a special Sharia (Islamic law) court to certify that Pakistan's laws were consistent with the Quran. Zia also cooperated with conservative religious, parties, just as the Jamaat-i-Islami. Which earlier governments required regarded with revulsion. But Pakistan's nuclear program, not its domestic, political scene or events in the region, dominated Shah's talks in Washington. US Secretary Vance asked for three guarantees: Firstly, that Pakistan did not relocate atomic equipment to other Muslims and other countries, secondly, that it permitted them its nuclear services to international inspection and thirdly, that it does not test a nuclear bomb. Pakistani foreign minister Shahi gave the US sectary Vance satisfaction only on the first step. Pakistani Foreign Minister said that Pakistan would refuse to permit inspection of Kahuta and other nuclear installations unless India similarly opened its nuclear facilities to inspection. On the question of testing, the diplomat stated

that Pakistan “she does not accept that three-stage” And Pakistan would review the pros and cons later it managed the essential ability to blast atomic device (Pattanaik, 2003).

At one point, Vance said that he wanted to speak alone with Shahi in his private office. To the Pakistani visitor’s surprise, he found nuclear expert Gerard Smith already present there. Flat punctually began to hammer away about the dangers that nuclear proliferation posed for Pakistan: US Threat Pakistan you must keep in mind you are entering the valley of death? And Do you consider that you are improving your security plan through developed the nuclear device and what you are doing right now? The Indians army and Government are far ahead of you since the birth of you. The Indian army can utterly destroy Pakistan”. You will Take a back, Shahi replied that he did not have to be a nuclear expert to understand that “the value of a nuclear bomb capability lies in its possession, not in its use” (Pattanaik, 2003). Despite these bilateral frictions, US Pakistan relations improved to one sensitive area: that of intelligence cooperation. After losing electronic listening posts in Iran because of the revolution, U.S officials approached Zia about collaboration in the collection of communications intelligence. After the president agreed to cooperate, the Central intelligence agency (CIA) provided technical assistance and equipment to improve Pakistan’s electronic intercept capabilities. US intelligence agencies received the data collected by these installations but did not station American specialists in Pakistan. Although far more limited in scope than the arrangement for Badaber, which was a large and entirely US-manned facility, the accord nonetheless marked a significant development in the bilateral relationship.

In July 1979 President Jimmy Carter also appropriate a minor undercover assistance program for Afghans opposing the Communist government in Kabul. The U.S CIA agency worked with its Pakistani counterpart, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), to channel aid to the fledgling Afghan resistance movement. This aid was built on the covert capability that Pakistan had earlier developed against the Dawood government. After Zia seized power, the direction of the covert assistance passed form the Frontier Scouts to the ISI (Chengappa, 2004), whose chief, Lt. Gen. Akhtar Rahman Khan, was a close confidant of Zia. The covert US help involved propaganda support and nonmilitary assistance but did not include arms or ammunition. Agreeing Robert Gates, a later director of the CIA, the funding level was modest less than \$1 million. Though U.S and Pakistan agency CIA and ISI struggle was the seed from which the vastly larger and eventually fruitful Afghan covert program grew. Although the strain in other facets of the relationship, growing cooperation between intelligence agencies signaled president Zia ul Haq attention in maintaining Pakistan’s contacts with the United States and Capital Washington’s reciprocal willingness to collectively work with Pakistan when it suited US interests, notwithstanding the two government’s substantial differences, especially over nuclear issues.

The Nuclear Issue and Sanctions

Pakistan has claimed that its nuclear program was spurred on by India's rapidly growing capability in the 1960s. After the one year of partition, India established its Atomic Energy Commission under the internationally known scientist Dr. Bhabhi who openly reported to the Indian Head of the Government. In the 1960s Indian Scientist was capable to acquire a MW plutonium manufacture device is called the Canada India Reactor (CIR) lacking protections. In 1964s Hindustan complete a handling nuclear plant with the support of the U.K and U.S sellers. Hindustan could excerpt 13 kg of weaponries position plutonium the equal of three atomic bombs annually, by the mid-1960(Khan, 2001).

Islamabad had established its Atomic Energy Institute in 1955, and had significantly promoted from U.S President Eisenhower's 'Nuclear for pure peace' program; specifically, the US government provided Islamabad near about 70,000 items of data about nuclear atomic energy. That was an enhancement to the atomic energy electorate in Pakistan.³² in the 1950s the training of nuclear physicists and engineers was accomplished. During 1960 to 71 the nuclear atomic program encouraged a developed stage of growth when the prominence shifted to starting a nuclear device program in Pakistan. Compassion to the New Delhi atomic program, Islamabad growth was certainly very uncertain. Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1971-1977) as an Indian Research scholar Ashok Kapoor indicated, 'mobile atomic nuclear nationalism in Islamabad.³⁰ plus Subsequently nuclear atomic weapons, as a warning in contrast to India's overpowering power, arrived the societal awareness of Islamabad politically aware leadership strategic, planners, and the common community. With the unexpected appearance of Pakistani nuclear scientist Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan on the scenario in 1974,Z.A Bhutto was to recognize the potential, of an enhancement nuclear technology the so-called Atomic uranium route to weapons (Kapur, 1987). The Afghan Aspect and Zia's Demise

Pakistan and the U.S artificial a friendly connection in the rouse of the USSR military intervention in Kabul since 1979and Zia Deceases Less than a few months later on August 17, 1988. Zia, Raphel, Akhtar Rahman, U.S Ministry of defense representative, Brig. Gen. Herbert Wessom and high-ranking Pakistani brigadiers flew to Division Bahawalpur in southern Punjab to see firing tests by the M.1 Abrams tank was actuality deliberated for Pakistani army units. Next, the demo, Raphel, and Wassom and Pakistani officials had flown to Bahawalpur in a U.S army aircraft accept the president Zia UIHaq invite to coming back to the Islamabad in the Head of state C-130. Near About 10 minutes later departure the regularly trustworthy Pakistani air force craft one of numerous at President Zia ul Haq disposal began to splash and then crashed the Plan. All 32 peoples on the plan have died. The plane pilot no warning of misfortune over the control tower while just before the C30 crash the control tower room listens to a voice questioning what was wrong in the plane.

President Zia Ul Haq's death in a plane crash in Bahawalpur was a huge shock for all Muslim communities. Mr. Zia Ulhad ruled over Pakistan almost 11 years persuasive his war of Islamization fronting down the USSR on Afghanistan and going down the U.S on the atomic nuclear program was unexpectedly disappeared. USSR go back from Afghanistan individual partially the proficient U.S worried about a management void and thoughtful unpredictability in Pakistan. A sad Shultz, led the official U.S deputation to the funeral to pay tribute to the late leader part in the victory finished the USSR in Afghanistan. As the new US ambassador to Pakistan, Shultz left behind Robert Oakley, a senior diplomat who served as ambassador to Zaire and Somalia and was responsible at the time of Raphel's death for the Middle East, and South Asia, on the Countrywide Security Council, staff. Such a rapid appointment was unusual, but the Regan administration wanted an activist presence quickly on the ground (ul Haq, 2010). As Oakley put it, "They wanted to do it in a hurry because they didn't want to allow any time to go by lest the time creates uncertainty about our commitment. The situation was very unsettled in Pakistan".

Among Oakley's initial tasks was to oversee the investigation of the C-130 crash. The envoy and the acting president agreed on a joint US and Pakistani inquiry, which found insufficient evidence to support any explanations firmly. The report ended, nonetheless, with conflicting Pakistani and American views. In the absenteeism of hard evidence, of machine-driven failure, the Pakistani investigators determined that damage was the apparent reason. In dissimilarity, the U.S investigation team not discovered reliable proof for damage decided that a machine-driven failure, perhaps led to the C30 crash. The US and Pakistani authorities released a thirty-page summary in late 1988, which Oakley said accurately reflected the full two-hundred-page report, which remains classified. The fact that the FBI did not participate in the joint investigation raised suspicions about a cover-up in Pakistan and also on Capitol Hill. Because of congressional pressure, the FBI some month later conducted a separate inquiry, which reportedly reached similarly inconclusive findings of why the plane crashed.

A decade later, the cause of the tragedy remained a mystery. US Government officials familiar with events, on the whole, continue to believe that the C-130 went down because of some unexplained mechanical failure. Many senior Pakistanis remain convinced that the plane was sabotaged. Some saw the hand of the USSR spy agency (the KGB); others blamed the Afghan secret service (the Khad); still others Indian spy agency "the Research and Analysis Wing, or Raw" and some even thought that the CIA was behind the crash, although Raphel and Wassom were killed along with Zia.

The year 1988 was overshadowed by improvements that almost pushed the nuclear issue aside. The signing of the Geneva Peace Accords, the death of Pakistani President Zia-ul-Haq, elections in both Pakistan and the United State.kept the policy-makers involved in both the countries. President Reagan exchanged messages and felicitations with Prime Minister Junejo at the signing of

the Geneva Agreement. The death of Pakistani President ZiaUl Haq in a plane crash along with the American Ambassador in August brought Secretary of State Shultz to Islamabad, reaffirming the “strong U.S. commitment of Pakistan’s security and independence”. President Reagan assured acting President Ghulam Ishaq Khan of continued support from the United States (Zia, 2000, p.40).

Coincidentally, on Pakistan Voting Day a statement by the Carnegie Endowment, for Global Harmony assumed that “Pakistan finally appears to have developed atomic weapons, increasing the risk of an atomic war with India and representing the main setback to determinations to stem the range of atomic arms around the globe (Muzaffar, et. al. 2017)

US Congress appropriated \$445 million in economic and military aid for Pakistan for FY 1989. This comprised \$230 million in foreign military sales credits and \$215 million in support funds. Appropriating the amount, the Senate Appropriation Committee hoped for the “completion of the country’s transition to democracy” (Zia, 2000).

President of Pakistan General Zia UlHaq was killed in C 30 plane crash in Bahawalpur on August 17, 1988,going back from an army base, in Bahawalpur in the mid-western part of Pakistan. Thirty-Two expired with him with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, of Staff, the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant, General Main Afzal, and eight, other senior officers of the Pakistan Army, the U. S Diplomat to Pakistan Arnold Raphel and a U.S brigadier, general. The news cast filtered in gradually. ‘A broadcaster has just called to say a VIP C30 plane has vanished, read the note my secretary Farida, transported to me in a late evening meeting with get-together workers.

Pakistani Ex-Chairman of the Senate Ghulam Ishaq Khan Pakistan Radio announced was that pleasing over as President in accordance, with the constitution. When Ghulam Ishaq Kan himself performed on television to state that the votes would be held as calendar, we were even additional reassured. This was the first sign that was the military was dedicated to re-establishing democracy, in Pakistan. Ghulam Ishaq Khan a past official and important General Zia advisor could not hold elections if the military was not behindhand the decision (Bahadur, 1998).

Conclusion

Pakistan and U.S relationships in this age of Zia Era from 1977 to 1988 were very much important in world history. In 1977 July 5th Zia ulHaq takes over the Z.A Bhutto government in Pakistan. In the same year, 1977 jimmy carter become the president of the U.S. In the 1st month of 1978, Jimmy Carter the 3rd U.S head of state to an official visit tothe neighbor country of India. Unlike Eisenhower and Nixon, he did not stop in Pakistan. When International official department atomic technology expert Joseph Nye Tour Pakistan Capital Islamabad in September 1977, he brought only sticks Washington had withdrawn the principal carrot – the offer

to sell A-7 attack bombers. Nye warned the Pakistanis that if they persisted with the French fuel reprocessing project, the United States would have to cut off economic assistance under the Glenn amendment to the foreign assistance act. For this time the U.S does not need Pakistan so she wants to stop the aids of Pakistan. After Zia refused to bend, the US government proceeded to suspend economic assistance. With aid levels running at about \$50 million annually, considerably less than during the halcyon days of the later 1960s, the economic blow was not enormous. Zia says that we did not need the peanut shuts. President Pakistan ZiaUlHaq's statement in the newspaper New York Times in September 1979, "We are not manufacturing an atomic bomb, and neither had we any objective of manufacturing an atomic bomb". The president of Pakistan Zia requested that the enhanced nuclear uranium driver was projected to produce nuclear energy for electric power need. "If Pakistan does not achieve the alternate source, of electric energy", President Pakistan Zia indicated, "Pakistan will not block in the next some coming years". Two ambassadors from the France Diplomat embassy in Islamabad the diplomat and the foreign secretary were driving in the vicinity of Kahuta afterward a convention of Europe Official diplomats. While their Official car was wandering on a community way and was not in the restricted area, Pakistani securities cars speedily jammed their road. Securities Pakistanis drew the diplomats from their car and take them their embassy. French blame on Pakistan government but the Pakistan government is not involved in this matter. This is the ground reality Pakistan unclear program in this Era.

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