



RESEARCH PAPER

Political Stance and Motives of PNA's Agitation behind *Tahreek Nizam-e-Mustafa*: A Critical Study

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ABSTRACT

This study aimed to examine the amalgamation of politics with religion. During the second tenure of Bhutto, some religious and political parties made a joint alliance due to electoral rigging. This alliance had political as well as religious goals yet, former was of primary significance. So, this study has revisited the utilization of religious thoughts to seek political closure. The focus of this research was to highlight the hidden goals of PNA in the guise of a religious movement. the enforcement of Islamic Laws and political as well as Socio-economic justice. This research paper will also reveal the fact that most political parties of this alliance used this movement as a tool for getting political power. The authors have also tried to highlight the objectives and consequences of the Nizam-e-Mustafa movement. This paper also highlights how much goals could be achieved by this alliance and movement

Introduction

Allied agitation against Bhutto commonly named as the *Tahreek Nizam-e-Mustafa* started in 1977 on claims of electoral rigging after a clean sweep of then Prime Minister Bhutto. The Movement finished when the weakening states of peace and show of people feeling in the exhibitions gave motivation to a military coup by General Zia on July 5, 1977. The outflow of Islamic demands was utilized as an avocation for the stress on Islam applied by Zia. It is a general misapprehension that this movement was raised solely for the authorization of Shariah. But in reality, it was a political movement raised by mainstream, liberal

and religious fundamentalists. Religious matters were utilized to strengthen the public opinion and political power behind the political stance of the opposition alliance.

The religious sentiment was largely involved in the political scenario during the Bhutto regime and religio-political groups utilized it in their support. They also started *Khatam-e-Nabowat* Movement and then the *Ahmadiya* class was declared as non-Muslim by the constitutional amendment. Similarly, due to a strong religio-political scenario, Bhutto diverted his socialist ideas in the politics of Islam. After the rigging allegations in 1977 elections, a powerful agitation started for new elections which later on, converted into *Tahreek Nizam-e-Mustafa*.

This research has multi-dimensional aspects in the history of Pakistan. Many religious, as well as political parties, had demonstrated his sole determination in the perspective of freedom, stability, and Islamic appropriation. We knew that religion has influenced the political system of Pakistan because the sentimental affiliation of the people with Islam encouraged the religious classes to form public opinion for a pure Islamic State. But it is problematic for any politico-religious and so-called enlightened group to question the procedure of the Islamic system in Pakistan. Therefore, these parties worked on the secular and socialist plan to stay enthusiastic within the scheme of Islamic Ideology.

The Conceptual and Theoretical Framework of the Study

Nizam-e-Mustafa Movement and the formation of Pakistan National Alliance

To shape a typical front against the governing body a meeting of the pioneers of the opposition was held on October 30, 1976, at Lahore. This meeting was organized by the National Democratic Party (NDP) in which Maulana Noorani President (JUP), Mufti Mahmud (JUI), Mian Tufail Ameer (JI), Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan of Pakistan Democratic Party and Pir Pagaro President of Muslim League. The NDP was headed by NDP president Sherbaz Mazari and some others like Begum Wali Khan, Barrister Zahoorul Haque and Mehroz Akhtar. Ashgar Khan, the head of Tehrik-e-Istaqlal, did not participate in this meeting. (Mazari, 2006) The need for electoral collusion inspired the entire opposition to join at the time of declaration of the elections. On September 17, 1985, Newspaper *Leader* wrote

“The declaration of the election positively affected the opposition coalition. The split opposition understood that they would get an opportunity of accomplishment in the general election by the joint coalition against Bhutto. After the declaration of general elections, Moulana Norani communicated with the opposition pioneers to chalk out the tentative plan”. (Leader, 1985)

After a long negotiation, an alliance was formed which consisted of Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan, Tahreek-e-Istaqlal, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, Pakistan Muslim

League, Jamat-e-Islami, National Democratic Party, Pakistan Democratic Party, Khaksar Tahreek and Azad Jammu Kashmir Muslim Conference. Scorn for Bhutto was the firm factor in PNA that included heterogeneous parties. The majority of them were liberal and secular and representing the whole range of modern political thought and ideological orientation. The JI, JUI, and JUP were the rightist fundamentalist parties while PDP and the PML were moderated. Similarly, the TI was left to the middle and the NDP was liberal in orientation. (Mujahid, 1978) Both liberal and religious parties required a coalition to challenge the Bhutto as they all had not in a position to gain public support. Jamat-e-Islami was well known in Karachi among the middle class. Despite its exertion, Tahreek-e-Istaqlal had not achieved fame among the average workers and laborers because it had only addressed the experts and industrialists. (Sultan, 1977)

Nizam-e-Mustafa Movement

To crush the Bhutto's secular government and enforce the Islamic system in the light of Prophet Mohammad's sharia, a joint opposition's movement was initiated by the Jamaat-e-Islami in 1977 which was called Tahreek Nifaz-e-Nizam-e-Mustafa. This alliance, which had started this movement, consisted of nine parties and this alliance was given the name of Pakistan National Alliance (PNA).

Settled points amongst the PNA's pioneers

Though the PNA stance about the enforcement of *Nizam-e-Mustafa* was a landmark and unique demand yet it had also some political objectives. In this alliance, the majority of the parties were not religious. Some had a liberal motto while some were conservative and leftist too. Pure Islamic system and laws could demolish this bogus political system of which they were beneficiary. So, they were desirous of getting political powers but not in favor of the enforcement of Islamic Sharia. To know either aim of PNA was to enforce Nizam-e-Mustafa or to gain some political interests, probe into the following accords and agreements which were finalized between PPP as well as PNA and the allied components of PNA. After several meetings, the PNA's pioneers affirmed to shape a coalition on the following points

1. Restoration of democratic government as indicated by the 1973 constitution and cancellation of all those amendments which made the constitution ineffectual.
2. Freedom and Supremacy of the judiciary.
3. The removal black laws, state of emergency and different curbs on common freedoms.
4. Political and Socio-economic justice. (Mazari, 2006)

Major Issues before the PNA

According to the above-mentioned situation, this alliance had some flaws and issues due to the opposite kind of manifesto. According to Sharif al-Mujahid, the following three most puzzling issues standing up to the PNA were

1. How to stay united in any event during and after the election?
2. How to determine issues of filling top PNA workplaces?
3. How to draw up an intelligible compromise deal which would from one perspective, fulfill a rather dissimilar view focuses within the collusion and still then again have enough intrigue for voters. (Mujahid, 1978)

Distribution of Tickets and its Indications

After the finalization of this alliance, the next task was to contest the election of 1977. For this, a meeting was called to discuss the distribution of tickets in which it was decided to gather at the head office of JUP at Lahore on January 10, 1977. Later on, this meeting was shifted to Rafique Ahmad Bajwa's residence due to the fear of intelligence agencies' interference. In this gathering, work was done for the portion of seats to various parties. After a warm discussion, it was concluded that JUP and TI would have 36 percent of the national and provincial assemblies and the ratio between JUP and TI would be 17 and 19 percent respectively. (Khan, We've learnt nothing from History, 2005) Muslim League (Qayyom) was a mere ideological party that did not join the alliance. (Pickard, 1977) The religious parties got the status of Secretary-General recommended by JUP. The focal parliamentary board would comprise of the pioneers of component parties. (Ahmad G. , 1988)

In the distribution of tickets, liberal groups got 51 % of the total seats and the number of allotted tickets amongst them was Tahreek-e-Istaqla 30, Muslim League 36, Pakistan Democratic Party 13 and Khaksar Tahreek 2. On the other hand, religious groups were allocated 49 % of the total in which Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan was given 23, Jamaat-e-Islami 31 and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam 24 tickets. (Niazi K. , Aur Line Cut Gai, 1987)

The equivalent distribution amongst secular and religious parties denoted that this movement was not interested in the enforcement of Sharia. Besides this, some leftist parties such as Sindhi People's Movement, Sind Peasant Committee, the Pakhtonkhawa National Awami Party, Workers Party, and Mazdoor Mahaz were not part of this alliance however they participate freely in this effort. (Sultan, 1977) These parties did not appeal to enforce *Nizam-e Mustafa* and kept themselves bound to oral support. In the beginning, PNA's agitation was against the electoral rigging and dismissal of Bhutto but later on, the slogan of *Nizam-e-Mustafa* was adopted due to the public sentiment. (Chishti, 1992)

Main Features of PNA's Agitation Plan

For a powerful protest against the Bhutto regime, it was decided to call a strike and public gatherings occurred in every town and city on March 11, 1977. PNA also made a plan to agitate on the 14th of March until the approval of their demands. But PPP and PNA came on a dialogue table. During the negotiation, demands introduced by the PNA had political interests not religious. The pioneers of PNA recommended 30 proposals whilst the key demands were as under. (Markhan, 1977)

1. Annulment of the Elections.
2. Dismissal of the Chief Election Commissioner.
3. The resignation of P.M. Bhutto.(Ali, 1977)

On March 20,1977, two new requests were made by Asghar Khan. They were

1. Discharge around 50 thousand political detainees.
2. Demolish media censorship and military laws.(Khan M. A., My Political Struggle, 2008)

Bhutto requested the PNA pioneers to withdraw their illegal demands and to agree with fruitful and acceptable points through negotiation but alliance ignored this idea of conversation. On March 24, Mufti Mahmud again demanded that Bhutto should leave his office, the election commission should be demolished and elections should be annulled. The public was inspired to join the agitation through the incitement of their religious assumptions.(Kamm, 1977) Punjab could be productive for acknowledgment of the political demands of the movement. Even though the movement had a heavy quantity of resources in various parts of the country, it had the minimal possibility of compelling Bhutto except if it could make genuine difficulty in Punjab. To get the support of Punjabi people, the religious and fundamental ideologies could be a better method of appeal. So, religious demands were presented to attract the public.(Khan, We've learnt nothing from History, 2005)

Regarding the *Nizam-e-Mustafa* Movement, various Ulama addressed to the public after prayer at *AikMinar Masjid* in Lahore on March 31, 1977. To prevent the public from holding the procession, police used *lathi* and violated the sacredness of the mosque by entering with their shoes which were observed as offensive. Police mistreated even those in the demonstration of planning or praying for supplications, which left numerous with serious injuries. Despite these circumstances, Bhutto did not annihilate the importance of fundamental political demand.(Borders, 1977)

It is not mentionable that PNA's pioneers included this demand and it was also a motto of PNA's declaration. Later this topic achieved substance in the movement.(Chishti, 1992)On April 16, *Dawn* Published that

"On April 15, Bhutto presented a formula for settling the deadlock by Attorney General Yahya Bakhtiar. This formula recommended new elections to all provinces with the stipulation that if PNA won a larger number of seats then Bhutto would advise the President to dismiss the National Assembly and announce new elections. But PNA pioneer refused to accept this offer and repeated its demands for the resignation of Bhutto and the Chief Election Commissioner before new elections".(Dawn, 1977)

Asghar Khan affirms that the stance of enforcing Sharia was not one of the PNA's demands and nobody took the Bhutto's offer to Join Advisory Council Conference for the enforcement of Sharia. According to him

"On April 17, 1977, Bhutto not only invited Mufti Mahmud, S. A. Norani, and Moulana Moudodi to join the Advisory Council for the enforcement of Sharia but also declared Islamic Rules including the boycott of alcohol deal and utilization, betting in all sorts of games like horse racing, closure of bars and night clubs and the holiday of Friday than Sunday. Bhutto reaffirmed his belief in Islam and his assurance to present Islamic Laws. He ensured to impose *Sharai Qawanin* within a half year if the suggested Advisory Council finalized the task in time. As PNA pioneer recognized these protestations about Islamic change exclusively to derail the primary issue of new elections so, nobody took it seriously".(Khan, *We've learnt nothing from History*, 2005)

As the key demands of the PNA were political then Bhutto's primary offers and concessions also remained political. These offers consisted of the referendum and new elections. On April 19, it was his 6th endeavor of compromise to feel the outcomes of religious demands in the public. He reaffirmed his belief in Islam and his assurance to present Islamic Laws. He ensured to impose *Sharai Qawanin* within a half year if the suggested Advisory Council finalized the task in time. He also ensured to restore commission on Islamic rules and regulations.(Borders, 1977)

On 24 April, Bhutto also assured the PNA to execute Islamic Laws due to the religious components of PNA yet, they could not reach on final decisions due to the unpractical expectations of the opposition. According to the PNA's pioneer, this was made to divert the primary issue of re-elections.(Khan, *Generals in Politics of Pakistan 1958-1982*, 1983) The demands offered during the negotiation were not religious but only focused on Political aims. The purpose of settlement amongst all allied parties was to focus on conducting new fair and free elections and oust the Bhutto. The religious stance was merely voiced by the religious pioneers whilst the leftist and secular segments did not support them.

Among them, there was a clear shortage of settlement amongst them on the issue of religion. The central interest was that the Military should formulate the government and ensure fair and free. (Ahmad A. , 1978) For example, On April 25, Asghar Khan composed a letter to the chief of staff committee and different army officials during his detainment in KotLakhat Jail. It was a reminder that the military had taken the oath to obey the officer and the legal order. (Khan, We've learnt nothing from History, 2005) In this letter he composed

“Bhutto has disobeyed the constitution and is blameworthy of a grave crime against the public. It is not your obligation to help his illicit crime nor you can be called upon to slaughter your public. In Karachi, firing on unarmed people by the army is unforgivable. As men of dignity, it is your obligation to perform your responsibility and the honorable obligation in these difficult conditions is not the blind dutifulness of illegal commands”. (Khan, We've learnt nothing from History, 2005)

Expectations of PNA

Pir Pagaro at a question and answer session informed the public with the expectations of PNA. According to *Dawn* on May 6, 1977, these expectations were as under

1. The prompt lifting of martial law and emergency as well as section 144 of the code of the criminal system.
2. To release all the political detainees.
3. Dissolution of special tribunals and courts.
4. To regulate the media.
5. To dissolve the National and Provincial Assemblies within seven days after the final settlement.
6. To appoint a new Election Commissioner with mutual understanding.
7. To announce new governors of all the provinces.
8. Transformations in all key posts with mutual understanding and assurance of new and fair elections”. (Dawn, 1977)

The Accord between PPP and PNA

Bhutto requested the PNA pioneers to give up additional demands if they are serious in meaningful conversations with the government. Bhutto also met with Mufti Mahmud but all in vain. On May 11, the National Assembly passed a bill prohibiting inebriating liquor. (The Times, 1977) But the allied opposition did not pay a lot of attention to the Bhutto's Islamic measures and refused to accept Bhutto's concession as it was a political maneuver. (The Guardian, 1977) So, a ten-member implementation committee was formed. After a few meetings, the participants agreed upon a settlement on June 15, 1977, and on June 16, 1977, it was declared that a settlement, based upon the following points, had been confirmed between the two groups and would be shaped into writing. (Haider, 1996)

1. The new and fair election would be held very soon.
2. The military would be pulled back from Baluchistan.
3. All special courts would be closed down especially Hyderabad conspiracy case and every political detainee would be discharged.
4. All controversial amendments regarding basic human rights would be considered inoperative.
5. All the restrictions on the press would be removed.
6. On Radio and TV, equivalent time would be given to PPP and PNA.

The state of emergency and military rule would be revoked on the finalization of the contract. (Mazari, 2006)

It was also settled that the contract would be signed by Mufti Mahmud and Bhutto on June 20, 1977, and this task was allotted to Hafeez Pirzada and Ghafoor Ahmed. (Mazari, 2006) The PNA team made a revised format including extra points of interest about constitutional status, power, formulation, and intensity of the proposed Implementation Council and forwarded it to the Bhutto on his return on June 23, 1977. At the next gathering on June 25, Bhutto provided the PNA team a substitute contract drafted by his team.

"Bhutto had a genuine complaint about the proposed Implementation Council being given the intensity of a super-government". (Mazari, 2006)

The PNA Council affirmed the transformed outline on June 27, and Mufti Mahmud was given authority to consent the arrangement with the Bhutto if he acknowledges it yet, instead of any transforms he may recommend, must be taken back to PNA council. Bhutto and Mufti Mahmud had met with each other on June 29 and 1st of July in which the PNA draft was examined and the dialogue carried

on for ten hours. Both made a concession and lastly, the PNA's new draft had sustained some change. The major features of this contract were as under

1. Termination of the Assemblies on July 15 and new elections would be conducted on October 8 and 10, 1977.
2. Conduct of the neat and free elections would be guaranteed by the Implementation Council based on equal members of both sides in the headship of Bhutto or a special situation by Mufti Mahmud.
3. Governors would be selected with the approval of PNA.
4. The governing authority would demolish the emergency, restore basic human rights, disband all special courts except Hyderabad and discharge all political detainees.
5. The election commission would include the five-member team all would be the justice of the Supreme Court. They would be appointed with the consent of PNA and this commission would have the managerial and monetary power as well as call the military especially in the days of elections.
6. The military action in Balochistan would stop within 45 days of the arrangement's approval.
7. All constitutional amendments which had the effected privileges of the citizens or power of the judges would be canceled.
8. The government would ensure the section of laws essential for putting this settlement into impact.(Ahmad G. , 1988)

The PNA general council also met and it was concluded that the recommendations of the ruling team could not be acknowledged because it did not give legal prestige to the agreement.(Khan, We've learnt nothing from History, 2005)

Although one striking element of mottos was a prospect for the imposition of Islamic laws Generals considered that it was started against fresh elections which later on, changed into a movement for sharia.(Haider, 1996)

Ghafoor Ahmad and Mufti Mahmud were bargaining and enjoyed the fruitful finish of accord with the arrangement of re-election under Bhutto. They invalidated proposed points for the implementation of Islamic law. But Asghar Khan requested a reestablishment of agitation because he was not confident of any positive result due to the Bhutto's shrewdness and this request seconded by Noorani and Mazari. The alliance achieved a public engagement from Bhutto to

conduct fresh elections. It was not Islamic issues where the religious gatherings were inclined to settle.

The PNA legal specialists were assigned the task not only to probe into the agreement but also to propose protection for the fresh and free elections. On July 2, 1977, they agreed on the following points

1. The Implementation Council must be provided full legal safeguards.
2. Any transformation in governors could be made by the harmony of the two parties.
3. The accords should be affected between PNA and PPP, not between Bhutto and Mufti Mahmud.
4. The election commission should be appointed with the mutual understanding of both groups.
5. Federal Security Force should be under the command of GHQ.
6. All laws that should be compulsory changed or amended would be revised and adjusted before the finalization of the accord.
7. The 'Expulsion of issues' provision to be re-instated.
8. Before the accord, all kinds of amendments must be approved by the PNA.
9. Cases in Special courts should proceed under the laws utilized in normal courts. (Mazari, 2006)

In the PNA meeting, Asghar Khan requested a reestablishment of agitation because he was not confident of any positive result due to the Bhutto's shrewdness and this request seconded by Norani and Mazari. On July 03, the PNA dialogue team provided nine extra points to Bhutto and informed him that these were typical and did not influence on the concurred settlement. (Mazari, 2006)

To get the legal opinion of his team, Bhutto requested the PNA team to provide one day for consultation. On July 03, Bhutto announced in a press briefing

"The discussions had broken down and he was unable to compromise with the PNA. (Khan M. A., 2005)

It was shocking news for all because Ghafoor Ahmad had narrated that all the focal matters had been resolved. He had also described that the agreed draft created on the guarantee of fair and free elections which was the only target of the PNA's agitation and dialogue with Bhutto. Yet, four key components appeared to contribute to the failure of the bargain, because, to ignore the PNA, Bhutto

departed on a six-day visit to Saudia, Kuwait, Libya, Afghanistan, and Iran. In his absence, Ghafoor Ahmad and Hafiz Pirzada made no ground in their main goal while PNA legal consultants pointed out a significant imperfection on the proposed contract. They opined that due to the absence of lawful protection in the event Bhutto decided to retreat from his commitments so, the points of contract must be given with some kind of constitutional protection. According to Mazari

No one of them was worried about Islamic issues and there was also a difference in political issues like the day of dissolution of assemblies, dismissal of the army in Balochistan and legal authority of Implementation Council. (Mazari, 2006)

Detecting failure, Bhutto played another card in the shape of counter-movement. For this purpose, he insisted on his supporters by removing Section 144. PPP gang along with the police took up the fight against the PNA supporters and the common war appeared imminent. (Weinbaum, 1977)

With the boost of the PNA protest, Bhutto felt that the blend of religious intensity with political matters was catastrophic so, to counter religious trends and achieve political targets, he decided to highlight religious matters. "Slogan of Socialism" was discarded from the literature of PPP and converted to a more bulky expression "*Musawat-e-Mohammadi*". In an acute comparison, it was the idea of trinity outlined in the elections of 1970 as Islam, socialism, and democracy. (Richter, 1979)

During *Tahreek Nizam-e-Mustafa*, Bhutto's twist to Islam was not a new one. To utilize the religious matters for politics by his political rivals and public made him already famous in existing Islamic aspects, so, he intended to offer a program of social and legal changes to stop the moderates against him. He affirmed the boycott of alcohol deal and utilization, betting in all sorts of games like horse racing, closure of bars and night clubs, the holiday of Friday than Sunday and suggested blackout the laws in the light of standard Islamic norms. (Richter, 1979)

Incidentally, the movement finished without the accomplishment of religious objectives however there were amusing political assertions of the triumph of people. After the Military coup, the PNA started to deteriorate on the matters of cooperation in the Civilian Cabinet of the ruling class, Islamization of laws, and the election plan, privatization of educational institutions as well as industries and foreign strategy. The first to escape from the PNA was the TI and then NDP and JUP separated themselves a little later. The PML was divided into three adversary groups whilst the NDP diverged into two factions. (Qureshi, 1979)

Conclusion

Every movement has its different purposes. On behalf of the various objectives, the same and complete goals cannot be obtained by any movement. Movement can only be succeeded in those manners when the allies of that

movement have only one point agenda. The alliance of PNA was at pale due to the international discriminations. Asghar Khan declared to disaffiliate his party from the coalition announcing it inadequate to take the country out of the then political crises. Besides this, he announced that this alliance was established to eliminate Bhutto so there was no more need for this coalition. Moulana Norani also had appealed the resignation of Mufti Mahmud as the headship of the coalition which was due to the sectarian covetous among the politico-religious parties. The stance behind *Nizam-e-Mustafa* was an aspiring of the regime to placate Bhutto's opposition to initiate the accountability procedure before the elections. The leaders of these political parties were aware of the circumstance which they had to face during the Islamic system. As a result, this movement could not flourish and achieve its religious goals rather than politics. If this alliance consisted of only pure religious parties then we could conclude that this alliance was serious in imposing Islamic Sharia. In a nutshell, after every above conversation, it can be said that the *Nizam-e-Mustafa* movement had a political stance and religion was just utilized to pull in the open help. The synthesis, leadership, targets, strategies, demands, events and even anti-movement steps of the ruling party all demonstrated that it was not a religious one. It was a post-movement story of the military government that stressed religion as a focal point of the movement.

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