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Arms Rivalry in South Asia: The Prisoner’s Dilemma Paradigm
AbstractOne of the central problems in relations between Pakistan and India in South Asia is the issue of cooperation. The focal point in this study is the application of game theory in a situation of deterrence between the two countries. The question is “Why are India and Pakistan unable to stop their nuclear arms race?”, as building peace in South Asia would clearly be in the best interests of both. Game theory provides a strong traditional analysis of the Pakistan-India situation, and it clarifies how both countries can find a way out of this low-paying situation. The nuclear arms race between Pakistan and India can be seen as an example of the “prisoner’s dilemma”. The objective of this research is to describe all the payoff matrices of the prisoner’s dilemma to understand the situation comprehensively and find a way for both countries to reach the outcome of arms control in their arms race. An attempt has also been made to see how the United Nations’ new agenda for disarmament could work in this situation.
- Qasim Shahzad Gill
- Johnson-Shoyama Graduate School of Public Policy, University of Saskatchewan, Canada